A professional’s knowing submission of a disputed partnership deed may sustain prosecution for conspiracy.

Respondent No. 4 alleged that he held a 50% interest in M/s. Amber Enterprises under an unregistered partnership deed dated 6 September 2002, and that the other partners later registered a firm of the same name, excluding him.

The firm formed in 2002 had entered into tenant agreements and obtained SRA approvals, including a Letter of Intent dated 26 March 2004.

The Applicant, an architect for the project, had submitted a certified copy of the 2002 deed to the SRA.

After receiving Respondent No. 4’s notice dated 14 October 2004, which identified the dispute and asked him not to proceed without consent, the Applicant submitted the registered deed dated 31 March 2004—excluding Respondent No. 4—to the SRA on 3 February 2011.

Following investigation, chargesheets were filed; the Applicant sought to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

1. Whether the allegations and material against the Applicant warranted quashing the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

2. Whether the Applicant’s conduct, despite his asserted professional role and absence of alleged personal financial gain, prima facie supported an inference of involvement in the alleged offences, including conspiracy or common intention.

The Court considered its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, described in the judgment as now corresponding to Section 528 BNSS, and stated that it must be exercised with care to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

The Applicant relied on Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka for the principle that a contractual breach does not, by itself, constitute cheating absent fraudulent or dishonest intention.

Respondent No. 4 relied on CBI v. Aryan Singh for the proposition that a quashing court should not conduct a mini-trial or determine whether the prosecution can ultimately prove its case.

The Court’s stated inquiry was whether the material disclosed a prima facie case or strong suspicion against the Applicant.

The Court found that the Applicant had submitted the 2002 deed naming Respondent No. 4 as a partner and therefore was prima facie aware of his asserted interest.

It also considered that the Applicant had received notice of the dispute in 2004 but later submitted the 2004 deed excluding Respondent No. 4, which bore the same firm name and address and treated business as commencing from 6 September 2002.

The SRA’s earlier approvals related to the 2002 firm, while the registered 2004 deed was submitted only in 2011 to satisfy the LOI condition requiring registration of the partnership deed.

Taken together, these circumstances raised, in the Court’s view, a strong suspicion of the Applicant’s involvement in a conspiracy or common intention to exclude Respondent No. 4; the absence of an alleged financial benefit to the Applicant did not negate that prima facie inference.

The Court therefore declined to determine the merits through a quashing application.

It also refused the request to continue the interim relief for four weeks.

The supplied judgment’s operative paragraphs do not separately state the disposition of Criminal Application No. 655 of 2017.