A purely civil dispute over rental obligations cannot sustain criminal prosecution.

The informant entered into a written agreement with the petitioner for establishing and operating a mineral-water plant on rented premises at a monthly rent of ₹6,500.

The petitioner allegedly paid rent until 31 December 2012, thereafter stopped making rent and electricity payments, closed the premises, and put a lock on it.

The informant allegedly could not contact the petitioner and, after sending a legal notice, filed an informatory petition and representations before the police authorities.

The complaint was subsequently directed to be registered under Section 156(3) CrPC, resulting in Beur P.S. Case No. 50 of 2014.

After submission of the charge-sheet and cognizance, the petitioner sought discharge under Section 239 CrPC; the application was rejected by the A.C.J.M. XII, Patna, on 9 November 2016.

Charges were thereafter framed, and the petitioner challenged the proceedings before the High Court.

Whether the allegations, taken at their face value, disclosed the ingredients of any criminal offence or merely constituted a civil dispute arising from a rental and business agreement.

Whether continuation of the criminal prosecution and rejection of the petitioner’s discharge application amounted to an abuse of the process of court.

Whether the impugned order dated 9 November 2016 and the subsequent criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed in exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The Court considered Section 239 CrPC, which permits discharge in a warrant case instituted on a police report where the charge is groundless.

It applied the principle that criminal proceedings should not be used to give a criminal colour to a dispute that is essentially civil or contractual in nature.

The Court relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories concerning allegations that do not disclose an offence and proceedings instituted maliciously or for an ulterior purpose.

It also relied on Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 (10) SCC 690, regarding abuse of criminal process in civil and property disputes.

Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, holds that summoning an accused is not a mechanical exercise and requires application of judicial mind to determine whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding.

The Court treated the substance of the allegations as relating to non-payment of rent and electricity dues, non-enforcement of contractual terms, and the petitioner’s closure and locking of the rented premises.

These allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, disclosed a contractual or landlord–tenant dispute and did not establish the requisite criminal intent or a prima facie criminal offence.

The Court therefore applied the Bhajan Lal principles and the rule against converting civil disputes into criminal prosecutions.

In view of the essentially civil nature of the grievance, the continuation of the prosecution was held to constitute an abuse of the process of court.

It also quashed the subsequent criminal proceedings arising out of G.R. No. 1643 of 2014 and Beur P.S. Case No. 50 of 2014, holding that the dispute was purely civil in nature and that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of court.