A registered sale deed’s recitals of consideration do not preclude proof that the transaction was sham.

Krishna Rao executed a registered sale deed dated 19 March 2010 in favour of the appellants for stated consideration of ₹1,21,50,000. He later sued to have the deed declared null and void, alleging that it was sham and nominal, unsupported by consideration, and procured through fraud and undue influence by the first appellant, an advocate known to him.

After Krishna Rao’s death, his wife and children were brought on record; a claimant under an alleged Will was also involved in the proceedings.

The appellants separately sued to recover possession of a portion of the property occupied by Krishna Rao’s wife.

The Single Judge declared the sale deed null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs, granted related injunctive and possession relief, and awarded damages for use and occupation; the appellants’ possession suit was dismissed.

The appellants challenged those decisions and also the rejection of their application under Section 47 CPC, which alleged that the original suit had abated.

Whether the registered sale deed dated 19 March 2010 was a genuine and valid transaction supported by consideration and binding on the respondents

Whether the alleged lease dated 2 April 2009 was established and whether the decree in C.S. No. 925 of 2010 should be set aside

Whether the appellants were entitled to recover possession and whether dismissal of their possession suit should be set aside

Whether the order rejecting the appellants’ Section 47 CPC application should be set aside, including on the ground that the original suit had abated

The Court stated that non-payment of consideration, by itself, does not render a completed sale void; however, where the parties dispute whether a genuine sale transaction occurred, the court must assess the entire oral and documentary evidence and surrounding circumstances.

A registered instrument’s execution does not, by itself, settle the separate question whether the transaction it records was genuine.

Mutation of revenue records does not, by itself, confer title.

On abatement, the Court applied the procedural framework concerning substitution of legal representatives, referring to the prescribed 90-day period and the applications made to bring parties on record; it also considered the appellants’ Section 47 CPC challenge.

The Court rejected the argument that the registered deed’s recitals acknowledging payment conclusively established a genuine sale. It found that the Single Judge had considered the asserted sources and payment of the substantial consideration and that the finding of inadequate proof was not perverse or based on material misappreciation.

The evidence that the first appellant had acted as an advocate for Krishna Rao, together with the circumstances surrounding execution, supported the finding that the transaction was sham and nominal; the lease documents and later revenue mutations did not establish the genuineness of the sale or payment of the consideration.

Because the deed was held null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs, the appellants could not rely on it to establish a right to retain possession.

The abatement objection also failed: an application to implead a claimant as legal representative was filed within the prescribed period and allowed, and Krishna Rao’s wife and children were subsequently brought on record; the later dispute over the Will and transposition of the claimant did not invalidate the suit.

It dismissed O.S.A. Nos. 74 and 75 of 2025 and O.S.A. No. 126 of 2026, confirmed the decrees in C.S. No. 925 of 2010 and Tr.C.S. No. 768 of 2013 and the challenged order in the execution proceedings, made no order as to costs, and closed the connected miscellaneous petitions.