A remand court cannot examine challenges beyond the superior court’s specified mandate.

The petitioners, representing teachers employed in deficit grant-in-aid colleges, sought implementation of the Meghalaya Non-Government School and College Employees Centralised Provident Fund Act, 1969 (“1969 Act”) and the Provident Fund Scheme contemplated under it.

Following the remand, the State constituted/reconstituted the Board of Trustees, prepared draft schemes, approved the Board’s bye-laws, appointed a portfolio manager, and ultimately notified the Meghalaya Non-Government School and College Employees Centralised Provident Fund Scheme, 2026 (“2026 Scheme”) by notification dated 18 March 2026.

The petitioners objected that the 2026 Scheme departed from the earlier draft and court-supervised process, adopted an impermissible National Pension System-based defined-contribution structure, merged employees appointed before and after 1 April 2010, and altered the statutory Centralised Provident Fund framework.

The State contended that the remand was limited to examining implementation of the 1969 Act and any Scheme framed under it; that the Act had been implemented through the constitution of the Board, registration of bye-laws, appointment of the portfolio manager, and notification of the 2026 Scheme; and that the petitioners’ objections concerned the merits of the Scheme rather than non-implementation of the Act.

1. Whether the 1969 Act and the Provident Fund Scheme framed under it had been implemented by the State, within the limited scope of the Supreme Court’s remand?

2. Whether the petitioners’ objections concerning the architecture, investment structure, operational mechanism, and coverage of the 2026 Scheme could be adjudicated in the present remanded writ proceeding?

3. Whether the State had unlawfully departed from directions issued by the High Court during the court-supervised process for framing the Provident Fund Scheme?

The Court applied Section 4(1) and Section 4(2) of the Meghalaya Non-Government School and College Employees Centralised Provident Fund Act, 1969, under which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame a Centralised Provident Fund Scheme to be administered by a Board of Trustees, with authority to prescribe matters specified in the Schedule.

The Court further applied the principle that a court hearing a remanded matter must act within the specific terms of the remand and cannot ordinarily enlarge its scope, relying on Shivshankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char, (2023) 13 SCC 1, which holds that a remand order must be followed in its true spirit and that proceeding beyond its mandate is contrary to law.

The Court also held that the earlier draft scheme had no statutory or binding status because it had never been notified under the 1969 Act.

The Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s remand as narrowly confined to determining whether the 1969 Act and any Scheme framed under it had been implemented, and the extent of any non-compliance.

Section 4 did not prescribe a particular procedure, architecture, investment model, or operational mechanism for framing the Scheme; it empowered the State to determine the modalities of the Scheme within the statutory framework.

The petitioners’ objections did not assert that the 2026 Scheme had not been framed under the 1969 Act or operated outside its statutory contours. Instead, they challenged the Scheme’s design, including its defined-contribution structure, investment arrangements, and treatment of different categories of employees. Those objections raised questions regarding the merits or validity of the 2026 Scheme, not non-implementation of the Act, and therefore exceeded the scope of the remand.

The Court also found no prior judicial direction requiring the State to adopt the 2023 draft scheme or any particular modality. The earlier orders merely sought progress toward framing an appropriate Scheme in accordance with law and did not bind the State to a specific draft or require the petitioners’ consent.

Since the State had constituted the Board of Trustees, approved its bye-laws, appointed a portfolio manager, and notified the 2026 Scheme, the Court held that there was substantial compliance with the Supreme Court’s remand order.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of, with the Court expressly stating that it had not examined the merits of the petitioners’ objections concerning the 2026 Scheme’s architecture, investment framework, or operational mechanism. The petitioners were granted liberty to challenge the 2026 Scheme in appropriate independent proceedings, if so advised.