A request to adduce further evidence must be assessed by conduct after closure of evidence.

The petitioner-wife, respondent in C.P. No. 297 of 2021, challenged orders dated 11 September and 22 September 2026, which closed her evidence and rejected her request to recall the closure order and lead further evidence.

She had filed affidavit evidence as RW-1, was examined and cross-examined over several dates, and was discharged on 7 September 2026; the matter was then listed for her further evidence as a last chance.

On 11 September, her counsel sought to withdraw his vakalatnama and no further evidence was adduced, so the Family Court closed her evidence and listed the case for argument.

On 22 September, the Family Court rejected her recall application without inviting an objection, heard arguments, and fixed the case for judgment on 16 October 2026.

The petitioner offered to produce affidavit evidence of her remaining witnesses and ensure their attendance for examination and cross-examination.

Whether the Family Court’s orders closing the petitioner’s evidence and rejecting her recall application should be set aside, permitting her to adduce further evidence.

Whether the petitioner’s earlier conduct, before filing her affidavit evidence, could justify refusing her application to adduce further evidence.

No statute or precedent is expressly cited. The Court applied the procedural principle that, when deciding whether to permit further evidence, the relevant consideration is the party’s conduct after closure of the evidence already given—not conduct predating the filing of that evidence.

The Court also balanced the opportunity to present evidence against the need to avoid delay, directing the Family Court to proceed expeditiously and cautioning that it could proceed in accordance with law if the petitioner failed to produce her witnesses without sufficient reason.

The petitioner had completed her own examination and cross-examination as RW-1, but the Family Court had fixed a further date for evidence from her side.

The High Court held that her conduct before filing her affidavit evidence should not have been relied on to reject the later application to adduce further evidence; the relevant assessment was her conduct after closure of RW-1’s evidence.

In light of the manner in which the recall application was rejected and the imminent judgment date, the Court set aside both impugned orders, while imposing conditions intended to prevent further delay.

The Family Court was directed to fix a date immediately after the ensuing Puja vacation for the petitioner to file affidavit evidence of any remaining witnesses, serving copies on the opposite party, and to proceed toward disposal preferably by the end of December 2026.

The petitioner was required to pay costs of ₹5,000 to the opposite party on 16 October 2026 and ensure her witnesses’ attendance; failing sufficient cause, the Family Court could pass appropriate orders and proceed in accordance with law.