A retailer selling sealed manufacturer-packed food cannot be convicted for adulteration without proof connecting him to the offence.

On 3 March 2004, a Food Inspector of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation inspected the respondent’s shop and purchased three sealed 500-gram packets of “Mahadev” turmeric powder in the presence of a panch witness.

One sample was sent to the Public Health Laboratory, while two samples were retained for possible analysis by the Central Food Laboratory.

The Public Analyst reported that the turmeric powder was adulterated and misbranded because it contained artificial colouring matter and foreign substance, exceeded the permissible starch limit, and did not comply with Rules 32(e) and 32(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.

After obtaining sanction, the Corporation instituted Criminal Case No. 102 of 2004 against the respondent under Sections 7(i), 7(ii) and 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the accused on the grounds, inter alia, that the analytical method was unreliable, the statutory procedure had not been followed, the manufacturer had not been joined, and the prosecution had failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

The Corporation preferred the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

1. Whether the trial Court erred in acquitting the respondent when the Public Analyst’s report stated that the turmeric powder was adulterated and misbranded under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rules.

2. Whether the prosecution established compliance with the statutory requirements concerning service of intimation under Rule 13(2), sampling, sealing and packing under Rule 14, and the accused’s right to seek analysis under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act.

3. Whether the respondent, who sold sealed packets manufactured by another entity, could be held criminally liable for adulteration or misbranding when the manufacturer was not prosecuted and the requirements of Section 19(2) of the PFA Act were not satisfactorily addressed.

4. Whether the appellate Court should interfere with an order of acquittal in the absence of perversity, manifest illegality, or a conclusion that no reasonable person could have reached.

The Court applied Sections 7(i) and 7(ii), 13(2), 16(1)(a)(i), 19(2) and 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, together with Rules 13(2), 14 and 32(e)–(f) of the PFA Rules, 1955.

These provisions require the prosecution to prove adulteration or misbranding through legally reliable evidence and to comply with the statutory safeguards governing notice, sampling, sealing, analysis and the accused’s right to obtain Central Food Laboratory analysis.

Section 19(2) recognises the statutory defence of a vendor who purchased the article from an authorised manufacturer, distributor or dealer under a written warranty and sold it in the same condition.

The Court also relied on State of Gujarat v. Manishbhai Narandas Karia, 2007 (1) FAC 96, and other decisions concerning prosecution of vendors of sealed packaged food.

On appellate review of acquittal, the Court applied Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169, holding that although an appellate Court may reappreciate the evidence, it should not disturb an acquittal where two reasonable views are possible, particularly in light of the strengthened presumption of innocence.

The Court found that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The Public Analyst’s report was based on paper chromatography, which the trial Court considered unreliable in the circumstances, and the prosecution offered no satisfactory explanation for the approximately seven-month delay between receipt of the report and institution of the complaint.

The evidence also indicated that the intimation contemplated by Rule 13(2) had not been served, and that the requirements concerning drawing, sealing and packing of samples under Rule 14 had not been properly followed.

Further, the respondent was only a retailer selling sealed packets bearing the manufacturer’s details; the manufacturer was not joined as an accused, and the prosecution failed to establish the respondent’s personal responsibility for the alleged adulteration or misbranding.

The Court also held that the sanctioning authority had not properly applied its mind, rendering the sanction under Section 20 legally defective.

Since these deficiencies created substantial doubt regarding both the reliability of the analysis and the respondent’s connection with the alleged offence, the trial Court’s view was held to be reasonable and not perverse.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had committed offences under Sections 7(i), 7(ii) and 16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA Act.

The trial Court’s acquittal was supported by reasonable appreciation of the evidence and disclosed no manifest error or perversity warranting appellate interference.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, the order of acquittal was confirmed, the bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial Court.