A sale-agreement holder is neither a necessary nor proper party to a title suit.

The first respondent filed a suit seeking declaration of title and cancellation of a settlement deed dated 19 March 2010.

During the suit, the petitioner sought impleadment as the eighth defendant under Order I Rule 10 CPC.

He claimed an interest in the suit property through an agreement of sale said to have been executed by his father in 2017, under which ₹40 lakhs had been paid as advance towards a total consideration of ₹75 lakhs.

The trial court dismissed the application, holding that the petitioner’s claimed right should be pursued independently and that an agreement holder was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner, claiming through an agreement of sale, was a necessary or proper party to the suit for declaration of title and cancellation of the settlement deed.

Whether the trial court’s refusal to implead the petitioner warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Order I Rule 10 CPC governs the addition of parties to a suit; a person must be a necessary or proper party to be impleaded.

Article 227 of the Constitution permits the High Court to supervise subordinate courts, but interference is not warranted absent a material error or perversity in the challenged order.

A person asserting rights under an agreement of sale may pursue an independent remedy, including a suit for specific performance, rather than being impleaded in a suit to which that person is neither a necessary nor a proper party.

The petitioner’s asserted interest arose from his father’s agreement of sale and the advance payment, rather than from the title or settlement deed directly in dispute in the suit.

The Court concluded that impleadment would not enable him to obtain the relief associated with that agreement; he would need to pursue specific performance independently.

Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that he was neither a necessary nor a proper party was not perverse and did not warrant supervisory interference.

It left open the petitioner’s right to bring a separate suit and seek specific performance in accordance with law; there was no order as to costs, and the connected CMP was also dismissed.