A senior cannot claim pay stepping-up for a junior’s higher pay arising from a later BCR upgradation.

The applicant, a Postal Assistant senior to respondent no. 6, sought stepping up of his pay to match that of his junior, with consequential revision of pension and other retirement benefits.

He relied on an alleged pay disparity after financial upgradations under the BCR Scheme and sought relief after representations were unsuccessful; he had retired voluntarily with effect from 4 January 2015.

The respondents maintained that the junior’s higher pay resulted from an additional increment under the 19 March 2012 Office Memorandum and his later BCR upgradation, while the applicant’s increment due on 1 July 2006 had been withheld as a penalty.

The applicant relied on Note 10 to a Ministry of Finance notification, Union of India v. C.R. Madhava Murthy, and an earlier Tribunal order.

The Tribunal heard the application and dismissed it.

Whether the applicant was entitled to have his pay stepped up to that of his junior, respondent no. 6.

Whether the respondents’ pay fixation disclosed an anomaly warranting interference by the Tribunal.

Under the BCR Scheme, financial upgradation is granted on completion of the prescribed qualifying service; the Tribunal treated the resulting upgradation as a personal financial benefit rather than one based on seniority.

The respondents relied on the Office Memorandum dated 19 March 2012, which provided a one-time additional increment to eligible employees whose next increment fell between February and June 2006, and on Rule 10 of the CCS (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008 concerning increments in the revised pay structure.

They also relied on the Director General, Posts letter dated 2 November 2010 for the position that pay stepping-up was not admissible merely because a senior’s junior received a higher financial upgradation.

The Tribunal cited State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, 2017 SCC 148, for the principle that pay-scale determination is ordinarily an executive function and courts should generally defer to expert bodies.

The applicant’s cited authorities were noted, but the Tribunal did not set out or apply their specific rules in its reasoning.

The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was senior but found that the pay difference arose from distinct events: the junior received the additional increment under the 19 March 2012 Office Memorandum because his increment date fell in March, whereas the applicant’s fell in July; the applicant’s increment due on 1 July 2006 was also withheld under a penalty.

The applicant had already received BCR upgradation from 1 July 2005, while the junior received it from 1 July 2006.

On those facts, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents had fixed the applicant’s pay according to the applicable rules and that the junior’s later higher pay did not establish an actionable anomaly requiring pay stepping-up.

It also relied on the limited judicial role in matters of pay determination.

Original Application No. 437 of 2016 was dismissed; no relief was granted, and no costs were ordered.