A stigmatic termination of an Anganwadi Worker requires a regular departmental enquiry.

The petitioner was appointed as an Anganwadi Worker on 5 October 2007 and served for approximately ten years.

A show-cause notice was issued alleging absence from the Anganwadi Centre, failure to reside at the designated headquarters, and neglect of duties.

The petitioner contended that an earlier show-cause notice dated 28 June 2016 had already resulted in forfeiture of one month’s salary and was impermissibly relied upon again for termination.

By order dated 18 January 2017, the competent authority terminated her services on allegations of repeated absence, disobedience of official directions, carelessness, and indifference towards governmental welfare schemes; no regular departmental enquiry was conducted.

The petitioner’s appeal was allowed on 30 August 2017, but the second appellate authority, by order dated 4 December 2018, set aside the appellate order and restored the termination.

The petitioner challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution.

During the pendency of the petition, she continued in service pursuant to an interim order dated 3 January 2019.

Whether termination founded on allegations of misconduct, and expressed in stigmatic terms, could be imposed without issuing a charge-sheet and conducting a regular departmental enquiry.

Whether the termination order dated 18 January 2017 and the second appellate order dated 4 December 2018 were contrary to the State Government’s policy dated 10 July 2007 governing removal of Anganwadi Workers.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits, subject to the respondents’ liberty to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

A termination order that is founded on allegations of misconduct and casts stigma upon an employee’s conduct, character, or work cannot ordinarily be passed without a proper departmental enquiry and observance of natural justice.

The Court relied on Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, 2001 (3) MPLJ 616; Jitendra v. State of M.P., 2008 (4) MPLJ 670; and Malkhan Singh Malviya v. State of M.P., ILR (2018) MP 660, which establish that a stigmatic termination entails serious consequences and requires an enquiry.

Under Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, reasonable opportunity includes notice of the charges, an opportunity to contest the allegations and cross-examine witnesses, and an opportunity to make a representation against the proposed punishment after the enquiry.

The State Government’s policy dated 10 July 2007 permits removal of an Anganwadi Worker for negligent performance only after giving an opportunity of hearing and finding the worker guilty in an enquiry.

A prior show-cause notice or preliminary fact-finding exercise does not substitute for the regular enquiry required where termination is punitive and stigmatic.

The termination order did not merely discontinue the petitioner’s engagement simpliciter; it recorded findings that she was repeatedly absent, disobedient, careless, indifferent, and responsible for depriving beneficiaries of ICDS services.

These findings constituted imputations of misconduct and made the order stigmatic.

Since the respondents relied upon alleged instances of absence and prior reports to impose the severest consequence of removal, they were required to issue a proper charge-sheet and conduct a regular departmental enquiry affording the petitioner the procedural safeguards identified in Khem Chand.

The Court further found that the State policy itself contemplated removal only after an opportunity of hearing and an enquiry establishing guilt.

The admitted absence of any regular enquiry therefore rendered the termination legally unsustainable, and the second appellate authority erred in upholding it.

It consequently quashed the termination order and the second appellate order dated 4 December 2018.

Because the petitioner had continued in service under the interim order dated 3 January 2019, no separate order of reinstatement was necessary.

She was held entitled to all consequential benefits.

The State was granted liberty to proceed against her afresh in accordance with law, if so advised.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of.