A stigmatic termination of an Anganwadi Worker requires a regular departmental enquiry.

The petitioner was appointed as an Anganwadi Worker on 25 March 1999 and was serving at Anganwadi Centre, Khurrka, Tahsil Vijaypur, District Sheopur.

Following an inspection by the Women and Child Development Minister, allegations were made that supplementary nutrition had not been distributed for two months, that the Centre had earlier been found closed, and that the petitioner had been negligent in discharging her duties.

A show-cause notice was issued, and the petitioner submitted a reply.

However, without issuing a charge-sheet or conducting a regular departmental inquiry, the Project Officer passed an order dated 11 July 2019 removing her from service, attributing negligence and failure to properly operate the Centre to her.

The petitioner’s appeal was rejected on 11 November 2019.

During the pendency of the matter, the respondents advertised the post, and respondent No. 5 was selected and appointed as Anganwadi Worker at the same Centre.

Whether the petitioner’s removal from service, founded on allegations of negligence and misconduct and containing stigmatic findings, could be ordered without conducting a regular departmental inquiry?

Whether the subsequent selection and appointment of respondent No. 5 could survive if the petitioner’s termination was found unlawful?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits after the termination and appellate orders were set aside?

Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court may judicially review administrative action that violates natural justice or applicable service rules.

A termination order is stigmatic where it records misconduct, negligence, dereliction of duty, or other adverse findings affecting the employee’s future prospects; such termination cannot ordinarily be effected without a charge-sheet, reasonable opportunity of defence, and a regular departmental inquiry.

The Court relied on Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, which held that reasonable opportunity includes notice of the charges, an opportunity to contest the allegations and cross-examine witnesses, and an opportunity to make a representation against the proposed punishment.

It further relied on Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, 2001 (3) MPLJ 616; Jitendra v. State of M.P., 2008 (4) MPLJ 670; Malkhan Singh Malviya v. State of M.P., ILR (2018) MP 660, and Rajesh Kumar Rathore v. High Court of M.P., which establish that a stigmatic termination founded on misconduct requires compliance with natural justice and an inquiry.

The State’s policy dated 10 July 2007 specifically required that an Anganwadi Worker be given an opportunity of hearing and be found guilty in an inquiry before removal for negligence or failure to discharge duties.

Under Bibhudatta Mohanty v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 16, a subsequent appointment to the post is consequential and cannot survive when the underlying termination or selection is set aside.

The removal order did not merely terminate the petitioner’s engagement simpliciter; it expressly recorded allegations that she failed to distribute supplementary nutrition, remained absent without prior notice, did not regularly operate the Anganwadi Centre, and negligently failed to implement departmental services.

These findings amounted to a determination of misconduct and therefore rendered the order stigmatic.

Although a show-cause notice had been issued, the respondents neither issued a formal charge-sheet nor conducted a regular inquiry in which the petitioner could properly defend herself, test the evidence, or examine witnesses.

The contractual or appointment condition permitting termination without notice could not justify a stigmatic removal contrary to natural justice and the specific departmental policy requiring an inquiry before removal.

Since the termination was invalid, the appellate order confirming it also could not stand.

The appointment of respondent No. 5 was consequential to the petitioner’s unlawful removal and therefore could not defeat the petitioner’s right to reinstatement.

It consequently set aside the termination order dated 11 July 2019 and the appellate rejection order dated 11 November 2019.

The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith and grant all consequential benefits, except back wages, applying the principle of “no work, no pay”.

The State was granted liberty to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with law, if necessary.

The subsequent appointment of respondent No. 5, being consequential to the invalid termination, could not confer an independent right to continue in the post.