A subsequent FIR is maintainable when it alleges distinct acts despite a common property dispute.

The petitioner, arrayed as Accused No. 2, sought quashing under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) of Crime No. 45 of 2024 registered by the EOW Cyberabad Police Station for offences under Sections 406, 420, 419, 467, 468, 471, 506 and 120-B IPC.

The dispute concerned approximately 340 acres in Survey No. 1007, Kukatpally, claimed by the family of respondent No. 3, Mir Abbas Ali Khan, and opposed by persons claiming through transactions involving M/s. Prime Properties.

An earlier Crime No. 305 of 2014 relating to alleged cheating, forgery and fabrication concerning the same property had been quashed by the High Court on 28 January 2019, and the related SLPs were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 15 March 2021, according to the petitioner.

The petitioner contended that Crime No. 45 of 2024 was a prohibited second FIR based on substantially the same allegations, was instituted after suppression of the earlier proceedings, and contained no specific material against him.

The complainant alleged, however, that the present crime concerned distinct acts of threats, coercion and torture of his deceased father, procurement of signatures on blank papers and vakalaths, fabrication and use of documents, including an affidavit dated 19 November 2018 used in connection with the quashing of the earlier crime.

Whether Crime No. 45 of 2024 was impermissible as a second FIR concerning the same occurrence or transaction already investigated in Crime No. 305 of 2014.

Whether the earlier quashing of Crime No. 305 of 2014 barred investigation into the alleged subsequent acts of coercion, fabrication and use of documents.

Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclosed cognizable offences and specific involvement of the petitioner sufficient to justify continuation of the investigation.

Whether the disputed questions concerning identity, title, alleged Hiba transactions, genuineness of documents and mala fides could be adjudicated in a quashing petition under Section 528 BNSS.

The Court applied Section 528 BNSS, which preserves the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, while recognising that such power must be exercised sparingly.

Sections 406, 420, 419, 467, 468, 471, 506 and 120-B IPC were considered in the context of the allegations; Sections 406 and 420 require, respectively, the foundational ingredients of entrustment and dishonest misappropriation, and cheating involving dishonest or fraudulent inducement.

Under T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, a second FIR concerning the same cognizable offence or occurrence is ordinarily impermissible, but a fresh FIR based on a distinct subsequent occurrence or independent transaction is not barred; this distinction was reaffirmed with reference to Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI.

Under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, inherent jurisdiction may be exercised where allegations do not disclose an offence or proceedings are manifestly mala fide, but the power is exceptional.

Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra requires judicial restraint against stifling a legitimate investigation at the FIR stage where cognizable offences are disclosed.

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh establishes that FIR registration is mandatory where information discloses a cognizable offence, and absence of a preliminary inquiry does not by itself invalidate the FIR.

The Court also applied the principle that disputed questions of fact and evidentiary assessment cannot ordinarily be resolved through a mini-trial in proceedings for quashing.

The Court held that although both crimes arose from the same property dispute and involved overlapping background facts and persons, Crime No. 45 of 2024 alleged an additional factual foundation: coercion and torture of the deceased, obtaining signatures on blank papers and vakalaths, preparation and use of the affidavit dated 19 November 2018, and related subsequent acts.

These allegations could not, at the threshold, be conclusively treated as identical to the allegations forming the basis of Crime No. 305 of 2014. Accordingly, the rule against a second FIR did not automatically apply.

The earlier quashing order operated only in relation to the proceedings arising from Crime No. 305 of 2014 and did not, by itself, bar investigation into an independently alleged subsequent offence.

The FIR attributed specific participation to the petitioner, including alleged involvement in coercing the deceased and using documents allegedly obtained from him; whether those allegations were true was a matter for investigation and possible trial, not adjudication under Section 528 BNSS.

Questions concerning the deceased’s identity, title, validity of the Hiba and other transactions, genuineness of documents, and alleged mala fides involved disputed facts requiring evidence, and the Court declined to conduct a mini-trial.

The alleged suppression of earlier proceedings and absence of a preliminary inquiry did not independently justify quashing where the FIR disclosed cognizable offences.

It held that the present FIR was not shown, at the threshold, to be a prohibited second FIR because it alleged distinct acts of coercion, fabrication and use of documents connected with the earlier proceedings.

The Investigating Agency was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with law, and the Court clarified that its observations were confined to the quashing petition and would not influence the investigation, trial or determination of ultimate culpability.

Pending miscellaneous applications were closed.