A subsequent judgment cannot sustain review of an order that has attained finality.

The Applicant had originally sought pensionary benefits and conversion of his option from the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) to the General Provident Fund (GPF). His original application, OA No. 212/2008, was dismissed by the Tribunal on 8 May 2008 on the ground that, in the absence of enabling rules, the Tribunal could not direct the Respondents to accept the Applicant’s option and grant consequential benefits.

The dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 29371/2008 and by the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 26212/2012.

The Applicant later pursued further proceedings, including OA Nos. 604/2017 and 1790/2017, and W.P. No. 1949/2021, which was dismissed by the High Court on 17 April 2024, with liberty to file a review application before the appropriate forum.

In the present Review Application, the Applicant relied on subsequent decisions granting pensionary benefits to similarly situated employees and contended that he should receive identical treatment.

The Respondents opposed the application, arguing that it was not maintainable before the Tribunal, that the original order had attained finality, and that a subsequent judgment or change in legal position could not constitute a valid ground for review.

Whether the Review Application was maintainable before the Tribunal in respect of an order that had already been affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court?

Whether subsequent decisions granting benefits to similarly situated employees constituted a permissible ground for reviewing the Tribunal’s original order?

Whether the liberty granted by the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 1949/2021 authorised the Applicant to file a review before the Tribunal?

The Tribunal applied Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, read with Rule 24 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, under which the Tribunal possesses a limited power to review its own decisions.

This power is analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and is confined to discovery of new and important matter or evidence despite due diligence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or another sufficient reason of a similar nature.

Relying on State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta, the Tribunal held that an error requiring a long process of reasoning is not an error apparent; review cannot be used to correct an erroneous decision or re-argue the case; and a judgment cannot ordinarily be reviewed merely because of a subsequent decision of a coordinate or superior court.

The Tribunal also relied on Government of NCT of Delhi v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., for the principle that a subsequent change or reversal of law does not, by itself, justify review.

The principle of finality of litigation and the need to discourage repetitive proceedings was further emphasised with reference to Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat.

The Tribunal found that the Applicant was attempting, under the guise of review, to reopen and re-argue the merits of his pension claim, which was impermissible under the narrow scope of review jurisdiction.

The original dismissal had already been challenged before the High Court and the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the SLP meant that the decision had attained finality.

The subsequent orders in favour of co-employees did not disclose an error apparent on the face of the record in the original order, nor did they constitute new evidence that could not have been produced earlier despite due diligence.

The Tribunal further interpreted the High Court’s order dated 17 April 2024 as granting liberty only to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law; it did not specifically authorise the filing of a review before the Tribunal.

Since the High Court had referred to review of the earlier writ proceedings and had not reopened the Tribunal’s concluded order, the present application was held to be procedurally and substantively untenable.

The Applicant’s reliance on later judgments was therefore insufficient to overcome the finality of the original adjudication or satisfy the requirements of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

It held that the Review Application was not maintainable before the Tribunal because the original order in OA No. 212/2008 had been affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court and had attained finality.

It further held that subsequent decisions concerning similarly situated employees did not constitute a valid ground for review and could not be used to reopen the concluded proceedings.

Accordingly, RA No. 24 of 2025 was rejected as not maintainable, with no order as to costs.