A third-party employee lacks locus standi to seek vigilance or disciplinary action against a colleague.

The applicant, a Public Relations Assistant in the Directorate of Information and Publicity, Puducherry, challenged the alleged inaction of the Department on his complaints dated 13 February 2020 and 20 July 2020 against Respondent No. 3, a Sub-Editor.

He alleged that Respondent No. 3 had secured appointment in 2001 by producing a false experience certificate relating to the publication “Pon-Ka-Ma-Ya” and therefore was ineligible for appointment under the applicable Recruitment Rules.

The complaints were forwarded to the Chief Vigilance Officer, who returned them to the Department for appropriate disposal. The Department thereafter treated the complaints as closed and filed.

The applicant claimed that Respondent No. 3’s position in the inter-se seniority list would prejudice his own prospects of promotion to Assistant Director of Information and Publicity.

1. Whether the applicant, as a third-party employee, had the locus standi and a legally enforceable right to seek a direction concerning disciplinary or vigilance proceedings against another employee.

2. Whether the Tribunal should direct the Department to reconsider or act upon the applicant’s complaints alleging that Respondent No. 3 obtained appointment by submitting a false experience certificate.

3. Whether the Department’s decision to close and file the complaints was liable to be interfered with by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal exercised jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, but applied the principle that a stranger or third-party employee cannot ordinarily invoke tribunal jurisdiction to pursue disciplinary or vigilance action against another employee unless his own legally enforceable service rights are directly infringed.

Relying on Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, the Tribunal held that an Administrative Tribunal cannot entertain public-interest litigation at the instance of a stranger.

The Tribunal also considered the Recruitment Rules for Sub-Editor, which required a postgraduate degree in the prescribed language combination and at least one year’s experience in journalism.

The applicable administrative principle was that a competent authority’s decision to close a complaint, after consideration of the relevant records and vigilance input, would not be interfered with absent a sustainable ground for judicial review.

The Tribunal found that Respondent No. 3 had been selected through a competitive recruitment process in 2001, had produced original certificates for verification, passed the written examination and interview, and was recommended and appointed as Sub-Editor by the competent authority.

The alleged irregularity was not raised by the applicant at the time of appointment or for approximately nineteen years, which the Tribunal regarded as undermining the bona fides of the challenge and indicating a personal interest connected with the applicant’s promotional prospects.

The Department had referred the complaints to the Chief Vigilance Officer, and, after the complaints were returned for departmental disposal, examined the relevant facts before closing them.

Since the applicant was effectively seeking action against another employee without demonstrating infringement of an independent statutory right, and since the Department’s decision was not shown to be arbitrary or unsupported, the Tribunal found no basis for interference.

It further held that the Department had adequately dealt with the complaints by obtaining vigilance consideration and subsequently closing and filing them.

The Original Application was therefore dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.