A writ court cannot reappreciate disciplinary evidence absent perversity or procedural illegality.

The employee, a TASMAC Supervisor, was charged with misconduct following an inspection and audit that disclosed irregularities and an alleged shortage of ₹1,80,684.

He denied the charges; the department marked documents, including the FIR, but examined no witnesses.

After a domestic enquiry, he was dismissed from service. The single Judge set aside the dismissal and directed reinstatement with monetary benefits and interest, relying in part on inconsistencies between the inspection report and witness statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. in the criminal investigation.

TASMAC appealed, contending that the single Judge had impermissibly reappreciated the evidence.

Whether the single Judge exceeded the limits of judicial review by reappreciating the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and relying on Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements

Whether the absence of departmental witnesses, including the District Manager, or the employee’s reliance on the District Manager’s Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement was sufficient to invalidate the disciplinary finding of misappropriation

Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, judicial review of disciplinary proceedings is supervisory, not appellate: the court does not reappreciate evidence or assess its adequacy or reliability, but may intervene where, among other grounds, the finding is based on no evidence, is perverse, or the enquiry violates natural justice or prescribed procedure (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, as quoted at para. 16; Director General of Police, RPF v. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, as quoted at paras. 18, 21).

Disciplinary findings are based on the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt; strict rules of evidence do not apply.

The judgment treated the Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement as insufficient to establish the employee’s defence in the disciplinary proceedings.

The Division Bench held that the employee had not challenged the enquiry as procedurally unfair or the findings as perverse; his arguments principally concerned the absence of witnesses and the evaluation of documents.

It considered the documentary material relied on by the department sufficient to support the finding on a balance of probabilities, and held that the absence of oral testimony did not, by itself, invalidate the enquiry.

The employee’s assertion that he had handed the money to the District Manager was not proved: he could have called the District Manager as his witness, and the audit report did not record the alleged amount as available or receivable.

The single Judge therefore exceeded the permissible scope of judicial review by relying on criminal-investigation statements and independently reassessing the evidence.

It made no order as to costs.