Abetment of suicide requires active instigation and proximate nexus, not mere general domestic harassment.

The deceased, Chetnaben, married the respondent Manojbhai and resided with her husband and father-in-law.

On 09.01.2007, she allegedly cut her wrist and committed suicide by self-immolation using kerosene

Before her death, she filed a complaint (Exh-32) and gave a dying declaration (Exh-15) alleging that her mother-in-law and other relatives (who lived separately) harassed her regarding household work and taunted her by accusing her of stealing money and consuming food meant for her daughters

The State filed an appeal against the judgment dated 03.03.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, which acquitted the respondents of charges under Sections 306, 498(A), 114 of the IPC and Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act

1. Whether the allegations of taunting and domestic disagreements constitute "instigation" or "abetment" under Section 306 read with Section 107 of the IPC

2. Whether the prosecution established a proximate and direct causal link between the conduct of the accused and the deceased’s decision to commit suicide

3. Whether there exists any patent perversity in the Trial Court's order of acquittal warranting interference by the High Court under Section 378 of the CrPC

The Court primarily applied Section 306 (Abetment of suicide) and Section 498(A) (Cruelty) of the IPC.

It relied on Section 107 IPC to define abetment as requiring instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding, emphasizing that "instigation" requires a provocative act or omission that leaves the victim with no other option

The Court further applied the principles from Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, which mandates proof of direct or indirect incitement proximate to the time of the incident

Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, which establishes that an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal if two reasonable views are possible

The Court observed that the deceased lived with her husband and father-in-law, against whom no allegations were made, while the accused relatives lived separately

It noted significant discrepancies between the FIR and the dying declaration; in the latter, the deceased failed to name all the accused, mentioning only the mother-in-law and "samovadiya"

The Court reasoned that the allegations regarding quarrels over household work and taunts about milk and money were general in nature and did not meet the legal threshold of "instigation"

Furthermore, the deceased’s own statement indicated she acted because she "got excited" or "lost her temper," suggesting a subjective reaction rather than objective incitement by the accused

There was no evidence of any "proximate act" immediately preceding the suicide that compelled the fatal step

The Court concluded that routine domestic friction does not ipso facto amount to abetment without clear mens rea and a live nexus

The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the foundational elements of abetment under Section 306 IPC, as there was no evidence of active provocation or intentional aiding by the accused proximate to the occurrence

Since the Trial Court’s view was reasonable and not perverse, the presumption of innocence was reinforced, and no interference was warranted