Absence of eyewitness evidence alone cannot defeat a motor accident claim supported by police records.

On 13 April 2023, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Khemchand Kosre was travelling home on his motorcycle when, according to the claimants, respondent No. 1 negligently drove motorcycle No. CG-07/BX-2634 into his motorcycle from behind. Khemchand fell, sustained grievous injuries, and died during treatment the same day. His wife and parents filed a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation of ₹1,39,40,000.

The driver-owner denied negligence and alleged that the deceased had driven rashly and collided with his motorcycle. The insurer pleaded breach of policy conditions on the ground that respondent No. 1 did not possess a valid driving licence.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim principally because the alleged eyewitness, Laxminarayan Mahipal, was not examined and negligence was therefore not proved.

The Tribunal nevertheless found that there was no breach of the insurance policy, that respondent No. 1 held a valid driving licence, and that the deceased’s annual income was ₹5,00,000.

The claimants challenged the dismissal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, relying on the FIR, charge-sheet, merg intimation, and the principle that negligence in motor accident claims is to be determined on the basis of preponderance of probabilities.

1. Whether the claim could be dismissed solely because the alleged eyewitness to the accident was not examined, despite the existence of police records including the FIR, charge-sheet, and merg intimation?

2. Whether the Tribunal applied the correct civil standard of proof—preponderance of probabilities—in determining rash and negligent driving under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act?

3. Whether the Tribunal was required to determine the compensation payable after having found the deceased’s annual income to be ₹5,00,000, rather than dismissing the claim outright?

The Court applied Sections 166 and 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: a claim for compensation arising from a motor accident is adjudicated on the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities, and an appeal lies against the Tribunal’s award.

Relying on Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., the Court held that police records, including the FIR and charge-sheet, may constitute prima facie evidence of the accident and the involvement of the offending vehicle, shifting the evidentiary burden to the driver, owner, or insurer to disprove the allegations.

Following Meera Bai v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd., the Court reiterated that the absence of an eyewitness is not, by itself, sufficient to reject a motor accident claim where negligence can reasonably be established through official records.

The Court also relied on Geeta Dubey v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. for the principle that motor accident claims are not to be tested by the criminal-law standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but by preponderance of probabilities.

The Tribunal treated the non-examination of Laxminarayan Mahipal as fatal and concluded that the claimants had failed to prove that respondent No. 1’s motorcycle had struck the deceased’s motorcycle negligently.

The High Court held that this approach failed to account adequately for the FIR, charge-sheet, merg intimation, and other police records forming part of the record.

Under the principles in Meera Bai and Mangla Ram, the absence of direct eyewitness testimony could not automatically defeat the claim, particularly when the documentary record provided prima facie support for the accident and the involvement of the offending vehicle.

The Tribunal also failed to apply the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities and, despite accepting the deceased’s annual income at ₹5,00,000, did not undertake a computation of compensation.

Accordingly, the findings on negligence and the consequential issues relating to income and compensation required reconsideration.

The finding that there was no breach of the insurance policy and that respondent No. 1 possessed a valid driving licence was not disturbed.

Those findings were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

The Tribunal was directed to decide the relevant issues afresh without recording additional evidence.

The parties were directed to appear before the Tribunal on 5 October 2026 at 11:00 a.m.; the appeal was accordingly disposed of.