Accused has no right to unrelied documents before charge absent sterling-quality material crucial to framing charges.

A complaint was submitted alleging that M/s Balak Automotives Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Balak Autos Pvt. Ltd., along with the petitioners and others, had committed fraud in loan accounts, causing an alleged loss of approximately ₹28.99 crores to the Bank through diversion of funds, fabricated documents and fraudulent transactions.

The CBI registered FIR No. RC0512022S0001 under various provisions of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, and subsequently filed a charge-sheet against the accused.

After filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioners sought, under Section 91 Cr.P.C., copies of certain documents collected during investigation but not relied upon by the prosecution, including stock audit reports, loan applications, CIBIL reports, inspection and valuation reports, sanction letters, an enquiry report and legal opinion.

The learned Magistrate allowed the application on 14.07.2023 and directed the CBI to supply the documents.

The CBI’s revision against that order became infructuous after the High Court quashed the FIR and proceedings; however, the Supreme Court subsequently restored the criminal proceedings.

On restoration, the trial Court directed compliance with the earlier order.

The CBI then filed a revision along with an application for condonation of 942 days’ delay.

The Special Judge condoned the delay and, on merits, set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 14.07.2023.

Whether an accused is entitled, as a matter of right, to copies of unrelied-upon documents at the stage of framing of charge under Section 91 Cr.P.C.

Whether the documents sought by the petitioners fell within the limited exception permitting the Court to summon or examine unrelied material of “sterling quality” having a crucial bearing on the question of framing of charge.

Whether the Special Judge erred in setting aside the Magistrate’s order directing the CBI to supply copies of the documents.

The Court applied Section 91 Cr.P.C., which confers a discretionary power on the Court to summon documents where their production is necessary or desirable for an investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding; its application depends upon the stage and purpose of the proceeding.

Relying on State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, the Court held that an accused ordinarily cannot invoke Section 91 at the stage of framing of charge to introduce defence material.

Under Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin v. Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy, 2018 (1) RCR (Criminal) 774, a narrow exception exists where material collected and withheld by the investigating agency is of “sterling quality” and has a crucial bearing on the framing of charge.

The Court further applied Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 INSC 645; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1063, which clarified that an accused is ordinarily entitled to the list of unrelied documents, but not to copies of those documents as a matter of right before framing of charge; production may ordinarily be sought at the defence stage.

The broader approach in Kalyani Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2023 (3) RCR (Criminal) 535, was held to be subject to the subsequent clarification in Sarla Gupta.

The Court held that the CBI had already supplied the relied-upon documents and the list of unrelied documents, thereby informing the petitioners of the material in the investigating agency’s custody.

The fact that the documents had been collected during investigation and remained in the CBI’s possession was insufficient to invoke the Nitya Dharmananda exception.

The petitioners were required to establish, document by document, that the material was of sterling quality and had a crucial bearing on whether charges should be framed.

Their request for loan applications, CIBIL reports, inspection reports, valuation reports, sanction letters, an enquiry report and legal opinion demonstrated, at most, possible relevance or usefulness to their defence; it did not satisfy the stringent standard of the exception.

Since the petitioners principally sought the documents to establish their innocence, their request involved a defence exercise that could ordinarily be undertaken during trial.

The Special Judge had not permanently denied access to the documents but had preserved the petitioners’ right to summon or use them during cross-examination or defence evidence.

Accordingly, the impugned order correctly regulated the stage of production without violating the right to a fair trial.

Such documents may be summoned at that stage only in the narrow circumstances recognised in Nitya Dharmananda, namely where the material is withheld, in the investigating agency’s custody, of sterling quality and crucial to the determination of charge.

As the petitioners failed to establish these requirements, the Court upheld the Special Judge’s order dated 01.08.2026, dismissed the petition under Section 528 BNSS, and declined to restore the Magistrate’s order dated 14.07.2023.

The petitioners were, however, permitted to seek production or summoning of the documents at the appropriate stage of trial in accordance with law; the observations were confined to their supply before framing of charge and were not to affect the merits of the criminal case.