Accused’s failure to explain house murder under Section 106 Evidence Act completes the circumstantial chain.

The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of his wife, Jugmen, by the Sessions Judge, Surajpur.

On June 15, 2019, following a dispute regarding the appellant's alleged illicit relationship and poorly cooked food, the appellant strangulated the deceased with a scarf (dupatta).

He then attempted to stage the death as a suicide by hanging the body from a beam, but the scarf broke.

The appellant locked the house from the outside, fled to a relative’s house, and confessed the incident to them.

Medical evidence confirmed the cause of death as asphyxia due to throttling and classified it as homicidal.

The appellant denied the charges in his Section 313 CrPC statement but offered no evidence in his defense.

1. Whether the appellant is the author of the crime based on the established chain of circumstantial evidence.

2. Whether the burden of proof shifted to the appellant under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act to explain a "house murder" occurring in his presence.

The court applied Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the offense of murder.

It relied heavily on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which stipulates that when a fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon them.

The Court invoked the "house murder" doctrine established in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006), which holds that when a murder occurs in the privacy of a home, the inmates must provide a cogent explanation.

It further applied Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar (2021), stating that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an "additional link" to the chain of circumstances.

The Court first established that the nature of death was homicidal based on medical testimony and the presence of throttling marks.

Since the deceased was found dead inside the appellant’s house while only the two were present, the Court held that the circumstances were "especially within the knowledge" of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

The Court reasoned that in "house murders," the prosecution's burden of proof is comparatively lighter because it is nearly impossible to provide direct evidence of crimes committed in private.

Because the appellant failed to provide any plausible or convincing explanation in his Section 313 CrPC statement as to how his wife died or how the house came to be locked from the outside with him in possession of the key, the Court determined that the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete.

The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing a complete chain of circumstances, supplemented by the appellant’s failure to discharge his burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

The Court directed the appellant to serve out the remaining sentence.