Acquittal cannot be overturned absent perversity where solitary testimony is materially contradictory and medically unsupported.

On 4 June 2018, the appellant-informant alleged that respondent Suresh Mahto demanded ₹5 lakhs as rangdari and, later that evening, both respondents and others assaulted him, attempted to strangulate him, removed ₹50,000, and threatened to kill him.

The FIR was registered on 5 June 2018 under Sections 341, 323, 307, 379, 387, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 IPC. After investigation, the respondents were charge-sheeted and tried under Sections 307/34, 323, 341, 379, 387, 504 and 506 IPC.

The prosecution examined six witnesses; three witnesses were declared hostile, while the appellant testified as PW-4, the Investigating Officer as PW-5, and the Doctor as PW-6.

The trial court acquitted both respondents on 5 April 2025, finding material inconsistencies in the informant’s account, lack of reliable corroboration, doubtful medical evidence, and admitted prior enmity between the parties.

Whether the prosecution proved the alleged assault, attempted strangulation, extortion, theft, and criminal intimidation against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the appellant’s testimony and the official evidence?

Whether the trial court’s judgment of acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted interference in an appeal against acquittal?

The Court applied the requirement that the prosecution must establish the charged offences under Sections 307, 323, 341, 379, 387, 504 and 506 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

It assessed whether the testimony of a solitary occurrence witness could safely sustain a conviction, particularly where independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution and material contradictions existed.

The Court further applied the appellate principle that, in an appeal against acquittal, interference is justified only where the trial court’s view is perverse or legally unsustainable; an acquittal cannot be reversed merely because another view is possible.

Medical evidence must also materially support the prosecution version and cannot, where doubtful or inconsistent with the alleged occurrence, independently establish guilt.

The Court held that PW-4 was the sole witness to both alleged occurrences, while the three other examined witnesses had turned hostile and the alleged eyewitness Gulab Yadav was not examined.

His account materially varied: the FIR alleged that the respondents tied a rope around his neck and then threw him down, whereas his trial testimony described a different sequence involving a physical quarrel and an attempted placement of the rope.

The medical evidence showed only a superficial injury measuring 2” × 1/8” and was not recorded in a separate injury report; moreover, the Doctor’s endorsement showed examination on 5 June 2018 at 1:00 p.m., although the alleged assault causing the injury was stated to have occurred at 7:00 p.m. on 4 June 2018.

The Court also noted the admitted land dispute and prior litigation between the parties, which furnished a possible motive for false implication.

In these circumstances, the prosecution evidence lacked the reliability necessary to displace the acquittal, and the trial court’s appreciation of evidence was not perverse.

The appeal was dismissed, and a copy of the judgment along with the trial court record was directed to be sent to the trial court.