Acquittal cannot be overturned where the trial court’s view is a possible view on the evidence.

The appellant-informant alleged that, on 11 January 2012, the respondents came to his residence, abused him by referring to his caste, assaulted him and other persons with lathis, damaged property, and threatened him.

The prosecution examined seven witnesses, including the informant, injured witnesses, neighbours and the doctor, but did not examine the Investigating Officer despite repeated opportunities.

A counter-case, Tariyani P.S. Case No. 12 of 2012, had also been lodged by respondent Abhay Kumar concerning the same occurrence.

The trial court acquitted the respondents of Sections 147, 307/149, 341/149, 447/149, 504/149 and 506/149 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, but found them guilty under Sections 323/149 and 427/149 IPC and extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents committed an offence under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC?

Whether the alleged caste-based abuse occurred “in any place within public view,” thereby attracting Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act?

Whether the trial court’s acquittal of the respondents for the major IPC offences and the SC/ST Act offences warranted interference in an appeal against acquittal?

The Court applied Sections 307, 323/149 and 427/149 IPC, together with the provisions concerning rioting, wrongful restraint, criminal trespass, intentional insult and criminal intimidation, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act as applicable to the alleged caste-based insult committed in a place within public view.

It held that simple injuries caused by a hard and blunt object, without evidence of intention or knowledge to cause death, do not by themselves establish an offence under Section 307 IPC.

For an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, the prosecution must establish, inter alia, that the caste-based insult occurred in a place within public view.

The Court relied on Meharaj Singh (L/Nk.) v. State of U.P., (1994) 5 SCC 188, regarding the significance of prompt transmission of the FIR and the possibility of embellishment arising from unexplained delay.

It further relied on H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, holding that an appellate court may reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal but cannot interfere where the trial court’s view is a possible view; interference is justified only where the only possible conclusion is guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The High Court found material inconsistencies regarding the place and manner of occurrence: PW-1 placed the assault inside the verandah, PW-2 stated that it occurred at the door, and PW-3’s presence as an eyewitness appeared to have been introduced belatedly.

The non-examination of the Investigating Officer prevented the defence from formally proving contradictions in the witnesses’ prior statements and caused prejudice to the respondents.

The prosecution evidence also contained inconsistencies regarding where and when the written application was prepared, while the FIR reached the Magistrate only on 13 January 2012 and the counter-case had already been recorded, thereby creating doubt regarding the prosecution version.

The medical evidence established only simple injuries caused by a hard and blunt substance.

The Court held that the nature of the injuries, the absence of a deadly weapon, the spur-of-the-moment quarrel over placement of ash, and the absence of evidence showing an intention to kill did not establish Section 307 IPC.

Further, the occurrence was alleged to have taken place inside or at the entrance of the informant’s house, and the prosecution failed to prove that the caste-based abuse occurred in public view; the trial court therefore rightly declined to apply Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

In light of the contradictions, the counter-case, the delayed transmission of the FIR and the absence of the Investigating Officer, the trial court’s view was held to be a possible and reasonable view under the principles governing appeals against acquittal.

The appeal against acquittal was dismissed, and the trial court’s judgment was affirmed.

The Court also observed that, in an appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, the appellant could not challenge the sentence or probation granted in respect of the convictions under Sections 323/149 and 427/149 IPC.

A copy of the judgment and trial court records was directed to be transmitted to the trial court.