Acquittal cannot be overturned where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible.

On 3 September 2001, the de facto complainant alleged that accused No. 1, accompanied by his son (accused No. 2) and the complainant’s driver (accused No. 3), travelled in the complainant’s car.

On the Modhera–Chanasma road, accused No. 1 allegedly assaulted the driver, threatened the complainant with a Rampuri knife, forcibly obtained cash of ₹36,000 and gold articles valued at approximately ₹7,10,000, and caused the complainant to jump from the moving vehicle near Karoda bus-stand.

Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were subsequently found near the vehicle, while accused No. 1 had fled; an FIR was registered and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

The trial court examined ten prosecution witnesses and acquitted accused Nos. 2 and 3, although accused No. 1 was initially convicted.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the acquittal of accused Nos. 2 and 3.

During the appeal, the High Court was informed that accused No. 1 had also been acquitted in a separate appeal.

1. Whether the trial court’s acquittal of accused Nos. 2 and 3 was so perverse, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence as to warrant interference in a State appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.

2. Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that accused Nos. 2 and 3 had actively participated in, aided, or abetted the alleged offence committed principally by accused No. 1.

The Court applied Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, governing appeals against acquittal.

It relied on the principles in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, as reiterated in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, that an appellate court may fully reappreciate the evidence but must recognise the strengthened or “double” presumption of innocence following acquittal; where two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail.

The Court also relied on H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, holding that interference is justified only where the trial court’s view is not a possible view and the evidence permits only a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

It further referred to State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy @ Vemareddy for the principle that, where the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s appreciation of evidence, general agreement with the trial court’s reasons may ordinarily suffice.

The High Court found that the FIR attributed the active criminal conduct—assault, threats and taking of the complainant’s property—to accused No. 1 alone, without assigning any overt act or specific role to accused Nos. 2 and 3.

The complainant’s evidence, being the only direct evidence, did not establish that either respondent aided or abetted accused No. 1; in particular, the complainant stated that the driver was assaulted by accused No. 1.

The respondents did not flee: accused No. 3 remained with the vehicle and accused No. 2 was found after getting off an ST bus, while accused No. 1 had fled.

No recovery or discovery was made at their instance.

In these circumstances, the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution had not proved the respondents’ participation was at least a reasonable view.

Applying the heightened restraint applicable to acquittal appeals, the High Court held that the finding was neither perverse nor based on a misreading or omission of material evidence.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, and the trial court’s judgment and order of acquittal were confirmed insofar as they concerned the respondents.

The respondents’ bail bonds were ordered to stand cancelled, their sureties discharged, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.