Acquittal does not confer a right to reinstatement in temporary part-time employment.

The petitioner was appointed as a part-time Sweeper at Government Primary School, Sanwa-Rawan, pursuant to the State Circular dated 08.03.2011 and appointment order dated 30.04.2011.

He remained in custody from 22.05.2022 to 24.12.2025 in connection with a criminal case and was subsequently acquitted by the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Koriya (Baikunthpur).

During his incarceration, the School Management Committee temporarily engaged Respondent No. 7, Deepak Kumar Singh, to perform the sweeping duties.

After his acquittal, the petitioner sought to resume duty, and the District Education Officer and Block Education Officer issued orders directing his reinstatement.

The school authorities, however, declined to permit him to rejoin on the ground that another person had been engaged in his place.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 25.06.2026, which cancelled or declined to implement his reinstatement, and sought restoration to service with consequential monetary benefits.

Whether a person engaged as a temporary, part-time Sweeper has a vested right to reinstatement merely because he was acquitted of the criminal charges that resulted in his prolonged absence from duty.

Whether the petitioner could claim reinstatement when, during his incarceration, the School Management Committee had temporarily engaged another person to perform the same duties.

Whether the High Court should interfere with the impugned order refusing the petitioner’s reinstatement and direct the removal of Respondent No. 7.

The Court applied the principle that a temporary or part-time engagement does not confer a substantive or vested right to continuation or reinstatement, particularly where the incumbent remained unavailable to perform the assigned duties for a considerable period.

It further held that subsequent acquittal from criminal charges, by itself, does not automatically create a right to reinstatement in a temporary or part-time engagement.

The Court also recognised the authority of the School Management Committee to make a temporary engagement to meet work exigencies during the petitioner’s prolonged absence.

No specific statutory provision or judicial precedent was cited in the order.

The Court found that the petitioner’s engagement was only temporary and part-time, and that he admittedly could not discharge his duties during the period of his custody from 22.05.2022 to 24.12.2025.

In view of this prolonged unavailability, the School Management Committee’s temporary engagement of Respondent No. 7 was treated as an arrangement made to address an exigency of work, rather than as an unlawful displacement of a permanent employee.

Although the petitioner was acquitted, the Court held that acquittal alone did not revive or establish a vested right to a temporary engagement, especially when the petitioner had been unable to perform the work for a substantial period.

Consequently, the orders of the District Education Officer and Block Education Officer could not justify a mandatory direction for reinstatement or removal of Respondent No. 7.

It found no ground for judicial interference with the impugned order and declined to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner or remove Respondent No. 7.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.