An appeal against an interim construction order becomes infructuous once the construction is completed.

The appellant-plaintiff instituted a partition suit concerning the suit property and obtained an ex parte ad interim injunction.

The defendants/respondents subsequently applied under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking variation or discharge of the injunction.

The Trial Court allowed the application and permitted the respondents to complete construction already commenced on the property.

In appeal, the appellant alleged that the respondents had misrepresented that they were residing with their family in rented accommodation and had relied upon a sanction plan obtained after the Commissioner’s report and the initial injunction order.

The respondents contended that a provisional sanction had initially existed and that final sanction was granted in June 2025; they also submitted that the construction had already been completed pursuant to the impugned order.

On the basis of the latter submission, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal as infructuous.

Whether the Trial Court’s order modifying the ex parte ad interim injunction and permitting completion of the construction required interference in view of the alleged misrepresentation regarding the respondents’ tenancy and the alleged absence of a valid sanction plan.

Whether the appeal had become infructuous because the construction had already been completed pursuant to the impugned order.

Whether the appellant’s allegations regarding construction without valid statutory sanction could be pursued before the appropriate statutory authority notwithstanding dismissal of the appeal.

The Court considered the power under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which permits the court to discharge, vary, or set aside an injunction order.

The Court applied the procedural principle that an appellate challenge may become infructuous where the relief sought concerns an act that has already been completed and no effective relief remains to be granted.

It further recognised that alleged violations of governing municipal or statutory laws, including construction without valid sanction, may be independently raised before the competent statutory authority, which must decide the matter in accordance with law after hearing the concerned parties.

No judicial precedent was cited or relied upon.

The appellant raised substantial factual objections concerning the respondents’ claimed residential occupation of rented premises and the timing and validity of the sanction plan.

The respondents disputed those allegations and maintained that the construction had been supported by provisional and subsequently final sanction.

However, the decisive consideration for the Court was that the construction had already been completed pursuant to the impugned order.

Since the challenged interim order had already produced its practical effect, the Court held that no effective relief remained to be granted in the appeal and treated it as infructuous.

The Court therefore did not finally adjudicate the competing factual claims concerning the tenancy, sanction, or legality of the construction.

Instead, it preserved the appellant’s right to approach the appropriate statutory authority regarding any alleged violation of law.

CAN No. 1 of 2026 was consequentially disposed of.

The appellant was granted liberty to raise before the appropriate statutory authority any grievance concerning construction without valid sanction or violation of governing laws; such authority was directed to decide the grievance in accordance with law after hearing all concerned, uninfluenced by the dismissal of the appeal.

There was no order as to costs.