Acquittal in Abetment of Suicide Confirmed for Lack of Direct Evidence Proving Cruelty or Instigation.

The deceased, Varshaben, married Respondent No. 1 in 2010. Respondent No. 2 is the mother-in-law. Due to alleged harassment and the mother-in-law’s quarrelsome nature, the couple resided separately for seven months prior to the incident.

On April 1, 2012, the complainant (father of the deceased) received a call from Varshaben alleging harassment by her husband under the influence of alcohol. Later that day, Respondent No. 1 informed the complainant that Varshaben had left on a bicycle. Her body was recovered from the Narmada Canal on April 4, 2012.

The State appealed against the judgment dated November 26, 2013, passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar, which acquitted the respondents of charges under Sections 498A, 306, and 114 of the IPC.

1. Whether the trial Court was justified in passing the judgment and order of acquittal based on the evidence led by the prosecution.

2. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused subjected the deceased to cruelty and abetted her suicide.

3. Whether there is any manifest illegality, irregularity, or perversity in the trial Court's findings.

The Court applied Sections 498A (cruelty), 306 (abetment of suicide), and 114 (abettor present when offense committed) of the Indian Penal Code.

It further relied on Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the presumption of abetment of suicide and dowry death, noting that continuous cruelty must be proven.

The Court cited Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) regarding the double presumption of innocence in acquittal appeals, Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001), and Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) to define the requirements of abetment.

The Court observed that the prosecution’s case rested primarily on the testimony of the deceased’s parents and brother, which lacked corroboration from independent witnesses.

Crucially, the landlady (PW-5) testified that Respondent No. 2 never visited the couple's separate residence, undermining the allegation of instigation by the mother-in-law.

Regarding the husband, the Court found no medical evidence of physical violence (post-mortem showed death by drowning with no internal/external injuries) and no police record or independent testimony confirming his alleged habitual drunkenness or specific acts of cruelty "soon before death".

The trial Court’s decision was deemed a "possible view" as the ingredients of Section 306 (instigation or proximal act leading to suicide) were not satisfied.

The Court reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal unless the trial court's view is perverse or suffers from manifest illegality, which was not the case here.