Acquittal must stand where prosecution fails to prove rash and negligent driving beyond reasonable doubt.

On 28 August 2007, the complainant, Amrutji, and his daughters alighted from a jeep near Manpur Bus Stand.

While the complainant was paying the fare, another jeep allegedly came from the Bhiloda side at high speed and dashed against his daughter, Anju, who later died from her injuries.

The complainant identified the vehicle by its registration number, GJ-2-K-4087, and lodged a complaint.

The respondent was charge-sheeted under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 177, 184 and 134B of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The Trial Court convicted him under Sections 279 and 304A IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment and fine, while imposing no separate sentence under the Motor Vehicles Act.

In Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 2011, the Additional Sessions Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the respondent.

The State challenged that acquittal before the High Court.

Whether the Appellate Court was justified in reversing the respondent’s conviction and acquitting him.

Whether the Appellate Court properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution.

Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal suffered from any illegality, irregularity or perversity warranting interference in an appeal against acquittal.

The Court applied Sections 279 and 304A IPC, which require proof of rash or negligent driving on a public way and proof that such rash or negligent conduct caused the death, respectively.

It also considered the offences alleged under Sections 177, 184 and 134B of the Motor Vehicles Act.

On appellate review of acquittal, the Court relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

These authorities establish that an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but an acquittal carries a strengthened or “double” presumption of innocence, and where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not ordinarily be disturbed unless the findings are manifestly illegal or perverse.

The High Court found that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving rashly or negligently and that his conduct caused Anju’s death.

The site panchnama recorded that the accident occurred in the middle of the right side of the road, while the alleged eyewitness, Bhikhusinh, gave an account inconsistent with the panchnama regarding how the complainant and his daughters alighted and where the incident occurred.

The complainant was not acquainted with the respondent and implicated him primarily on the basis of the vehicle’s registration number.

These inconsistencies undermined both the identification of the respondent and proof of the essential ingredients of Sections 279 and 304A IPC.

Applying the limited-interference principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court held that the Appellate Court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor legally infirm.

It held that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt and that the Appellate Court had correctly appreciated the evidence in acquitting him.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the judgment and order of acquittal dated 6 June 2012 was confirmed, the respondent’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the concerned court.