Acquittal under Section 498A IPC does not bar proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act.

Respondent No. 1, the wife of Petitioner No. 1, filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) against her husband and his family members before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, in Complaint Case No. 02/2020.

She alleged neglect, mental cruelty, and dowry-related harassment concerning a demand for ₹1,00,000 and a motorcycle, and sought litigation expenses and costs.

The petitioners invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), challenging the registration/taking cognizance of the complaint.

They contended that the complainant had previously lodged an FIR under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code on the same allegations, in which the accused had been acquitted.

They also relied on the parties’ subsequent divorce and pending custody proceedings concerning the minor child.

Despite service of notice, the respondents did not appear before the High Court.

Whether acquittal in a prosecution under Section 498A of the IPC, arising from the same or substantially similar allegations, bars or invalidates a subsequent complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act?

Whether the Magistrate committed an illegality in taking cognizance of or proceeding with the complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act so as to warrant interference under Section 528 of the BNSS?

The Court applied Section 498A of the IPC and Section 12 of the DV Act as provisions operating in distinct legal fields and serving different purposes.

Section 12 of the DV Act provides a statutory mechanism for an aggrieved woman to seek reliefs in respect of domestic violence.

Section 36 of the DV Act expressly provides that its provisions are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law in force; consequently, proceedings under the DV Act are not barred merely because criminal proceedings under Section 498A of the IPC have concluded in acquittal.

The Court exercised its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to examine whether continuation of the complaint constituted an abuse of process or involved legal illegality.

The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the acquittal under Section 498A of the IPC automatically prohibited the complainant from initiating or pursuing proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act.

It held that the two statutory provisions have different objects and operate in separate spheres: Section 498A concerns the criminal offence of cruelty, whereas the DV Act is intended to provide broader and more effective protection to women against domestic violence and associated violations of their rights.

In view of Section 36 of the DV Act, the existence or termination of proceedings under another law does not, by itself, extinguish the remedies available under the DV Act.

Therefore, the prior acquittal, along with the parties’ divorce and pending custody dispute, did not demonstrate that the Magistrate’s taking cognizance of the complaint was legally impermissible or amounted to an abuse of process.

It found no illegality in the Trial Court’s taking cognizance of the complaint and dismissed/disposed of the petition under Section 528 of the BNSS.

The Court clarified that its dismissal would not prevent the Trial Court from deciding the complaint on its own merits and without being influenced by any observation in the High Court’s order.