Acquittal upheld where an uncorroborated secondary dying declaration failed to establish cruelty or abetment.

Kulsumben, wife of the respondent-accused, resided with him at the matrimonial home.

The prosecution alleged that the accused habitually consumed alcohol and subjected her to mental and physical cruelty, including assault with a wooden stick shortly before the incident.

On 12 December 2007, Kulsumben allegedly poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze.

She was admitted to G.G. Hospital, where her complaint was recorded and a dying declaration was subsequently stated to have been recorded.

She died from her burn injuries on 16 December 2007, following which the investigation initially concerning Sections 323 and 498-A of the IPC was extended to Section 306 IPC.

After trial in Sessions Case No. 45 of 2008, the Sessions Court, Jamnagar, acquitted the accused of the charges under Sections 323, 498-A and 306 IPC by judgment dated 30 June 2012.

The State preferred the present appeal against acquittal.

Whether the Trial Court committed an error in acquitting the respondent-accused.

Whether the Trial Court committed any error of law or fact in appreciating the prosecution evidence.

Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal suffered from illegality, perversity or other infirmity warranting appellate interference.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent subjected Kulsumben to cruelty and abetted her suicide, thereby attracting Sections 498-A and 306 IPC.

The Court applied Section 498-A IPC, under which “cruelty” includes wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury, as well as harassment connected with an unlawful demand.

Section 306 IPC requires proof that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.

Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act permits, but does not require, a presumption of abetment where a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and was subjected to cruelty; the presumption must be considered in light of all the circumstances and cannot arise without cogent foundational evidence.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but the accused benefits from a double presumption of innocence, and an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views are possible.

The Court relied principally on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

The Court held that the prosecution evidence did not establish cruelty or abetment beyond reasonable doubt.

The alleged dying declaration was produced only as a xerox copy; its original, the police yadi and related documents were stated to have been misplaced by the Executive Magistrate.

The Magistrate had also obtained no medical endorsement regarding the deceased’s consciousness or orientation when the statement was recorded.

The prosecution failed to examine the doctor who recorded the medical history, and the hospital record contained a history that the burns were sustained while Kulsumben was preparing food, creating material doubt regarding the prosecution version.

The evidence of the deceased’s parents and brother was treated as insufficiently trustworthy and was not supported by prior complaints to the police or family elders despite alleged earlier disclosures of cruelty.

Other material witnesses were also not examined.

The allegations concerning a second pregnancy or abortion lacked support from the medical and documentary evidence.

Since the foundational evidence of cruelty was not proved, the statutory presumption under Section 113-A could not be invoked.

Applying the restrained standard governing appeals against acquittal, the Court found that the Trial Court’s view was reasonable, supported by cogent reasons, and neither perverse nor illegal.

The Trial Court’s acquittal was found to be lawful and supported by the evidence; no perversity, illegality or infirmity justified appellate interference.

The appeal was dismissed, the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30 June 2012 were confirmed, the respondent’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the Trial Court.