Administrative authorities may cancel provisional gathering permissions to prevent anticipated breaches of communal peace.

The Petitioners, BAMCEF and Bharata Mukti Morcha, sought to hold their 42nd National Convention and 15th BMM Convention at Lower Baliyatra Ground, Cuttack, from 26 to 30 December 2025.

The Collectorate issued provisional permission on 4 October 2025, subject to requisite no-objection certificates, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police issued a corresponding provisional permission/NOC on 1 November 2025.

The Petitioners deposited various statutory fees and incurred expenditure for the proposed event.

Subsequently, following circulation of a social-media video allegedly containing provocative and communally divisive statements, the Deputy Commissioner of Police cancelled the provisional permission by order dated 21 December 2025.

As the scheduled dates had passed, the Petitioners sought permission to hold the convention from 26 to 30 December 2026 and submitted a fresh application to the Collector, which remained pending.

1. Whether the cancellation of the provisional permission for the proposed convention, on the ground of potential breach of communal peace and public order, was arbitrary or unlawful

2. Whether the Petitioners acquired an enforceable right to hold the convention on the basis of the permissions/NOC issued by the Collectorate and Deputy Commissioner of Police

3. Whether the Petitioners were entitled to a direction permitting the convention in December 2026, notwithstanding the applicable standard operating procedure governing public gatherings

The Court applied Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, which protect freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully without arms, subject to reasonable restrictions, including in the interests of public order.

Relying on Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, (1973) 1 SCC 227, the Court held that the State may regulate assemblies in aid of the right and impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, while distinguishing reasonable regulation from arbitrary exclusion.

It also relied on Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439, which recognises the right to peaceful protest or assembly but permits regulation to balance that right against public order and the rights of other citizens.

The Court further held that the permissions in question were provisional and conditional; the Collector-cum-District Magistrate remained the final authority, and the applicable SOP governed any fresh application for a public gathering.

The Court found that the orders issued by the Collectorate and the Deputy Commissioner of Police did not constitute final permission.

The Collectorate’s order was expressly conditional upon obtaining NOCs from relevant authorities, while the Deputy Commissioner of Police’s order operated as such an NOC; final permission was yet to be granted by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate.

Accordingly, the Petitioners had no absolute right to conduct the convention merely because provisional permission had been granted.

The Court accepted that the viral video was not disowned by the Petitioners and that the district authorities had assessed it as provocative and capable of disturbing communal harmony.

Given the authorities’ responsibility to prevent breach of peace and maintain public order, the Court declined to substitute its view for that of the administrative authorities and held that cancellation of the provisional permission was neither illegal nor arbitrary.

With respect to the proposed 2026 convention, the Court held that the pending application had to be considered under the SOP dated 7 March 2026, which prescribed the procedure and conditions for private gatherings at Baliyatra Ground and similar venues.

It rejected the challenge to the cancellation and did not grant an unconditional direction permitting the 2026 convention.

The Petitioners were permitted to submit or pursue a fresh application in accordance with the applicable SOP and guidelines, which the competent authority was directed to consider in accordance with law.

The Court further directed that fees already deposited before the relevant statutory authorities could be adjusted against the fresh permission process.