Administrative transition and workload, unsupported by evidence, do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning inordinate delay.

The State sought to appeal the respondent’s acquittal in Special Case No. 53/2019 for an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

It filed the appeal with a delay of 770 days and applied under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to have the delay condoned.

The State attributed the delay to the abolition of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, transfer of its cases to the Karnataka Lokayukta, administrative and logistical difficulties, increased workload, and the 2023 State Assembly elections.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the explanations were general and did not account for the delay, including the period before the ACB’s abolition.

The judgment refers to the acquittal date as 20 April 2022 in its discussion, although the appeal prayer records 20 April 2019.

Whether the State established sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the 770-day delay in filing the appeal.

Whether the COVID-19 limitation-extension order granting 90 days from 1 March 2022 affected the limitation calculation so as to justify the delay.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits a court to condone delay upon proof of sufficient cause.

The Supreme Court’s COVID-19 limitation order in Miscellaneous Application No. 21/2022 in Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021 (10 January 2022) provided, in applicable cases, a 90-day limitation period from 1 March 2022.

In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Supreme Court held that governmental status, bureaucratic procedure, and file movement do not by themselves justify delay; the Government must provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation and show bona fide effort.

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, the Court rejected generalized administrative explanations for inordinate delay and reaffirmed that the merits of a case do not displace limitation requirements.

The High Court accepted that the COVID-19 order could give the State 90 days from 1 March 2022, if applicable, but held that this did not explain the further delay in filing the appeal.

The affidavits described administrative disruption, workload, and file-transfer difficulties but were unsupported by material substantiating those assertions.

Applying Living Media and Bherulal, the Court found that such generalized explanations were insufficient to establish sufficient cause for a 770-day delay.

It dismissed IA No. 1/2024 and, consequently, dismissed the appeal as time-barred, without deciding its merits; any pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.