Advanced pregnancy warrants one later PET opportunity when deferment was sought before the test.

The applicant applied under Railway Recruitment Cell Employment Notice No. 01/2010 for a Group ‘D’ post, qualified the written examination held on 3 June 2012, and was called for the Physical Efficiency Test (PET) on 6 November 2012.

At an advanced stage of pregnancy, she requested deferment by registered post on 18 October 2012, before the test date; she delivered a child on 8 December 2012.

The respondents rejected her request in orders dated 21 February 2018 and 26 September 2024, relying on the recruitment terms barring changes to the PET date or venue.

She sought an opportunity to take the PET and related consequential relief.

1. Whether the applicant could be denied an opportunity to take the PET solely because the recruitment notice barred changes to the test date or venue, despite her advanced pregnancy and prior request for deferment.

2. Whether delay and laches barred relief, given that the applicant approached the respondents before the scheduled PET and subsequently pursued her claim.

Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution protect equality, equal opportunity in public employment, and life and personal liberty; recruitment conditions must be applied consistently with these constitutional guarantees.

The Tribunal relied on Monu Kumari v. Staff Selection Commission, W.P.(C) No. 925/2017 (Delhi High Court, 3 April 2019), and Isha v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 3732/2019 (Delhi High Court, 25 July 2024), concerning pregnant candidates’ access to recruitment tests.

It also considered Khusbu Sharma v. Bihar Police Subordinate Service Commission, Civil Appeal No. 7661 of 2019 (Supreme Court, 27 September 2019), as supporting a means of accommodating pregnancy while preserving the integrity of the selection process.

Although the applicant relied on the Office Memorandum dated 19 July 1976, the Tribunal held that it need not apply that memorandum retrospectively to decide the case.

The applicant had qualified the written examination, sought postponement rather than exemption from the PET, and notified the respondents of her advanced pregnancy before the scheduled test; her delivery about a month later supported her explanation for non-attendance.

The Tribunal held that the no-change clause could not be considered in isolation from constitutional principles and the cited decisions protecting pregnant candidates from exclusion on that basis.

It treated the relief as limited: the applicant would still have to qualify the PET and satisfy all other applicable requirements.

In light of that limited relief and her prior pursuit of the matter, the Tribunal declined to reject the claim solely for delay and laches.

If she qualifies and meets the applicable requirements, her candidature is to be considered for appointment, subject to vacancy; neither taking nor passing the PET creates an automatic right to appointment.

Any appointment will be a fresh appointment, without retrospective seniority, continuity, arrears of pay or other consequential service benefits.

The relief is confined to the case’s particular facts, and there was no order as to costs.