Affidavit denial of service shifts burden of proof to claimant to establish service through cogent evidence.

The Respondent filed a commercial suit (3873/2024) against the Appellant regarding a hotel lease dispute.

The Trial Court issued summons on 28.11.2024. Based on a postal tracking report filed by the Respondent, the Trial Court proceeded ex-parte on 17.01.2025 and subsequently passed an ex-parte judgment and decree on 22.03.2025.

The Appellant moved an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the decree, claiming he only learned of the suit via WhatsApp on 11.04.2025 and was never served summons.

While the Trial Court condoned the delay in filing the recall application by accepting the Appellant's date of knowledge, it dismissed the main application on 18.11.2025, holding that the "refusal" noted in the tracking report constituted due service.

Whether the service of summons upon the Appellant, based on a postal endorsement of "refusal" without identification of the recipient, was sufficient and valid in law.

The court applied Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC regarding setting aside ex-parte decrees.

The court relied extensively on the evidentiary principles established in Parimal v. Veena (2011) and Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (1989), which dictate that while Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act create a rebuttable presumption of service for registered post, such presumption shifts the burden of proof back to the sender once the addressee denies receipt on oath.

The court noted that a specific denial of service by way of an affidavit constitutes a "credible rebuttal".

The Court observed that the Respondent’s claim of service rested solely on a tracking report marked "refusal" which failed to identify who refused the summons.

The Appellant provided a sworn denial of service, which the Court held effectively rebutted the initial presumption of service.

Consequently, the burden shifted to the Respondent to produce cogent evidence, such as examining the postal official, which the Respondent failed to do.

Furthermore, the Court found the Trial Court’s findings "mutually destructive": the Trial Court had condoned the limitation delay by accepting the Appellant’s claim that he only gained knowledge of the suit in April 2025, yet simultaneously held that he was duly served in December 2024. The High Court determined that if the lack of prior notice was accepted for limitation, it must also be accepted as "sufficient cause" for non-appearance.

The Court set aside the Impugned Order dated 18.11.2025 and the ex-parte decree dated 22.03.2025. The application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was allowed, and the suit was restored to its original position. The parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 20.05.2026 for further proceedings.