After an order is set aside, parties must pursue the pending Section 170-B proceeding before the SDO.

The petitioners, legal representatives of deceased Ramkrit Sao, challenged the Commissioner, Surguja Division’s order dated 26 September 2017, which affirmed the Collector, Jashpur’s order dated 22 July 2015.

The dispute arose from proceedings under Section 170-B of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, initiated after a complaint alleging that the petitioners’ predecessor had defrauded members of an aboriginal tribe in relation to the disputed land.

The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kansabel, by order dated 27 June 2008, found that the petitioners’ houses had been constructed and that they were in possession before 1984.

Instead of directing restoration of the land, the SDO ordered payment of the difference in the land’s value to the aboriginal tribal parties.

The petitioners deposited the amount on 4 August 2008.

On an appeal by the respondents, the Collector set aside the SDO’s order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, principally because the respondents’ signatures were absent from the relevant order sheet, indicating that they had not been afforded a proper opportunity of hearing.

The Commissioner dismissed the petitioners’ second appeal.

During the writ proceedings, it was also brought to the Court’s notice that the petitioners’ civil suit had been dismissed on 18 January 2021 as barred by Section 257(l-1) of the Code.

1. Whether the Collector was justified in setting aside the SDO’s order under Section 170-B and remanding the matter for fresh consideration on the ground that the respondents had not been afforded a proper opportunity of hearing?

2. Whether the dismissal of the petitioners’ civil suit affected their entitlement to contest the pending proceedings under Section 170-B before the SDO?

3. Whether any effective order continued to exist in favour of either party after the Collector set aside the SDO’s order and remanded the matter?

The Court applied Article 227 of the Constitution of India, under which the High Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and authorities.

It considered Section 170-B of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which governs proceedings concerning alleged unlawful transfers of land belonging to members of aboriginal tribes and permits appropriate corrective measures, including restoration or payment of the difference in value in circumstances recognised by law.

The Court also referred to Section 257(l-1) of the Code, which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in matters falling within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities.

A basic principle of procedural fairness and natural justice requires that affected parties be given a proper opportunity of hearing before an adverse order is passed.

The Court held that the SDO’s order dated 27 June 2008 had already been set aside by the Collector and that the matter had been remanded for fresh adjudication because the respondents appeared not to have been given a proper opportunity of hearing.

Consequently, the original direction requiring payment of the difference in land value no longer operated as an effective order.

The Court found that the proceedings under Section 170-B remained pending before the SDO and that neither party presently had a subsisting final order in its favour.

The dismissal of the petitioners’ civil suit for want of maintainability under Section 257(l-1) did not prevent them from defending themselves in the statutory proceedings before the SDO.

Since the writ petition did not challenge the maintainability of the Section 170-B proceedings themselves, the proper course was for the parties to raise all their factual and legal contentions before the SDO in the remanded proceedings.

It directed the parties to appear before the concerned SDO and permitted them to make all appropriate submissions in the pending proceedings under Section 170-B.

The SDO was directed to decide the matter afresh, on its own merits, in accordance with law and after providing proper opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties, preferably expeditiously.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of, and the interim order dated 4 May 2018 was vacated.