01Facts
The petitioner claimed a 1/15th share in the suit property as a successor-in-interest of one of its original holders. She challenged a 2020 sale deed executed in favour of respondent No. 1, alleging it was based on a false, unregistered and insufficiently stamped power of attorney and did not bind her share.
¶ 3–5 · pp. 2–3The trial court temporarily restrained the defendants from creating third-party rights in the property; the District Court allowed respondent No. 1’s appeal and set aside that injunction, taking account of evidence of payment to the petitioner and substantial development on the property.
¶ 6–7 · pp. 3–4The petitioner challenged the appellate order under Article 227 of the Constitution.
¶ 2 · p. 202Issues
i.Whether the District Court was justified in setting aside the trial court’s discretionary order granting a temporary injunction.
¶ 8, 13 · p. 4, 6ii.Whether, in light of the petitioner’s asserted 1/15th share and the development already undertaken, a blanket injunction against creating third-party interests was warranted.
¶ 15–21 · pp. 7–1203Law Applied
Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is not a substitute for an appeal on the merits. An appellate court reviewing a discretionary injunction order should interfere only where the discretion was exercised perversely or contrary to settled principles.
¶ 13 · p. 6A prima facie case alone does not justify an injunction; the applicant must also establish irreparable injury and that the balance of convenience favours relief. The court must weigh the likely injury to both sides (Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi).
¶ 16–17 · pp. 6–8The court must also consider the parties’ conduct and the consequences of restraining substantial construction; a long period of inaction and significant development may weigh against an injunction (Mandali Ranganna v. T. Ramachandra).
¶ 19 · pp. 8–9Where construction is substantial and the claimant can be protected or compensated without stopping it, the balance of convenience may lie against an injunction (ECE Industries Ltd. v. S. P. Real Estate Developers Pvt. Ltd.).
¶ 20 · pp. 9–1104Reasoning
The Court assumed, for the interlocutory stage, that the petitioner had a prima facie case that the sale deed did not bind her share, while leaving the validity of the power of attorney and the sale deed for determination at trial.
¶ 14–15 · p. 7It nevertheless found that a blanket restraint was not justified: the petitioner claimed only a 1/15th share, the other co-sharers had not challenged the transaction, and respondent No. 1 had carried out substantial construction, with third parties potentially affected by an injunction.
¶ 18 · pp. 8–9Applying the balance-of-convenience principles and the authorities on substantial construction, the Court declined to interfere with the District Court’s decision but directed security measures to protect the petitioner’s claim pending trial.
¶ 19–21 · pp. 9–1205Holding
The petition was partly allowed. The High Court affirmed the District Court’s order setting aside the blanket injunction, subject to respondent No. 1 depositing Rs. 11,34,666 with the trial court within two weeks and reserving a specified two-bedroom flat in the building under construction, undertaking not to create third-party interests in that flat.
¶ 22 · pp. 12–13The deposit and flat are to abide by the suit’s final outcome, and respondent No. 1 may claim no equity from those arrangements; there was no order as to costs.
¶ 22 · pp. 13–14Original Court PDF
Pushpa Kamlakar Patil Alias Usha Ashok GawadvsM/S. Sanyukta Realtor Thr. Its Partner Kiran T. Thakur And Ors
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