Allahabad HC Rejects Mutawalli’s Late Bid to Further Expand Removal Appeal Over Successor’s Appointment, But Keeps Pure Legal Grounds Open

The appellant challenged the Waqf Board’s order removing him as Mutawalli.

During the appeal, respondent No. 3 was appointed Mutawalli, and the appellant obtained permission in 2022 to amend his memorandum to raise matters concerning that appointment and the appointee’s eligibility.

After the Tribunal dismissed the appeal and the High Court remanded it for fresh adjudication, the appellant sought a further amendment in 2026, including additional grounds about notice, the Chairman’s authority to make the appointment, and consequential relief.

The Tribunal rejected the application, finding the existing pleadings sufficient and the further amendments unnecessary; the appellant appealed that rejection under Section 83(9) of the Act.

Order VI Rule 17 CPC permits amendment where necessary to determine the real questions in controversy; Section 107(2) CPC gives appellate courts, subject to statutory conditions and limitations, procedural powers corresponding to those of courts of original jurisdiction, while Order XLI Rule 2 governs the grounds on which an appellant may be heard and the consideration of additional grounds.

The court applied the principles in Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited: necessity, bona fides, effect on the nature of the case, prejudice, and whether the existing record permits adjudication are relevant considerations.

It also relied on State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. on amendment of a memorandum of appeal, and Smt. Munni Devi v. Smt. Shashikala Pandey on the relevance of due diligence without mechanically applying Order VI Rule 17’s proviso to appellate or revisional proceedings.

Under Asif Ansari v. Himanshu Sharma, refusal to amend does not necessarily prevent a party from advancing a pure question of law arising from the existing pleadings and record.

The remand’s terms control the scope of fresh proceedings; a time-bound direction is relevant but is not, by itself, an absolute bar to a necessary amendment.

The Court found that the earlier amendment had already placed respondent No. 3’s appointment and the appellant’s objections concerning lineage and eligibility before the Tribunal.

The appellant therefore had to explain why the additional factual grounds, known at that time, had not been included and demonstrate why they were necessary to decide the appeal within the remand’s scope.

The proposed particulars about notices were not shown to be necessary given the existing natural-justice and non-service grounds; the relevance of the later Section 54 notice was not established; and an independent challenge to the subsequent appointment could not be added merely because it concerned the same office.

The Tribunal’s decision to accept further objections from respondent No. 3 did not give the appellant an automatic right to amend, although he had to receive a fair opportunity to meet any relevant new plea.

The Court concluded that the existing pleadings were adequate and that the proposed additions were not shown to be indispensable or their refusal prejudicial.

It clarified that pure legal submissions arising from the existing record could still be advanced, and that the Tribunal could consider framing or reformulating issues where the existing pleadings disclose the factual foundation.

The appellant may advance legal submissions, including pure questions of law, arising from the existing pleadings and record, subject to the remand’s scope; the Tribunal may consider appropriate issues on the existing pleadings, but no fresh factual case may be introduced.

The Tribunal was directed to endeavour to conclude the remanded appeal, preferably within three months of production of a certified copy of the judgment; no opinion was expressed on the merits of the removal or subsequent appointment.