Tenant’s Late Bid To Challenge Rent Receipts With Handwriting Expert Fails After He Closed Evidence, Allahabad HC Upholds Refusal

The petitioner-tenant sought permission to examine a handwriting expert to support his claim that the landlord’s rent receipts were forged.

Although the expert was included in the petitioner’s witness list, the petitioner examined four other witnesses and, on 31 July 2025, expressly stated that no further evidence was required.

After the matter reached final arguments—and after the respondent’s counsel had concluded arguments—the petitioner applied to reopen his evidence, attributing the omission to counsel’s inadvertence.

The trial court rejected the application, and the revisional court dismissed the petitioner’s revision. The petitioner then sought relief under Article 227.

Section 151 CPC preserves the court’s inherent power, in an appropriate case, to reopen evidence or permit further evidence; Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC principally empowers the court to recall a witness already examined to clarify evidence and does not give a party an independent right to introduce further evidence.

Under Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410; K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275; Bagai Construction v. Gupta Building Material Store, (2013) 14 SCC 1; and Ram Rati v. Mange Ram, (2016) 11 SCC 296, reopening is discretionary and should be exercised judicially and sparingly, considering the proposed evidence’s purpose and relevance, the explanation for its earlier non-production, the stage of proceedings, bona fides, prejudice, and effect on progress; it is not ordinarily a means to fill an evidentiary lacuna.

Article 227 is supervisory, not appellate, and does not permit reassessment of a procedural order merely because another view is possible.

The expert was known to the petitioner, had been listed before the evidence closed, and could have been produced before the petitioner expressly stated that no further evidence was required.

The general claim of counsel’s inadvertence, even considered alongside the petitioner’s age and disability, did not explain why the witness was not produced or why the omission was not addressed until after the respondent’s arguments.

The asserted relevance of the disputed receipts and the possibility of imposing costs did not overcome the absence of a sufficient explanation and demonstrated necessity for reopening at that late stage.

The courts below considered the relevant circumstances, and their exercise of discretion was neither arbitrary nor legally unsustainable.

The petition was dismissed; the trial court was directed to proceed in accordance with law and endeavour to decide the suit expeditiously, without being influenced by observations on the merits of the parties’ claims. There was no order as to costs.