Allahabad HC Upholds Trio’s Life Terms In Gram Pradhan Rivalry Murder, Treating Extra-Shot Account As Embellishment

The appellants were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, for offences under Sections 302/34, 504 and 506 IPC; A3, Satish @ Sonu Singh, was additionally convicted under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act.

The prosecution alleged that, following a village political dispute, the accused assaulted Dharmendra Singh and A3 shot him in the head; Dharmendra died while receiving treatment.

The FIR was lodged two days after the occurrence.

At trial, the prosecution relied principally on three eyewitnesses, including PW-3, who claimed to have been injured, and medical evidence confirming a fatal firearm injury to the head.

The appellants challenged the convictions on grounds including delay and omissions in the FIR, inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, PW-3’s presence and injuries, investigative lapses, lack of common intention, and alibi.

The Court applied Sections 302/34, 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act.

It reiterated that FIR delay is not inherently fatal if satisfactorily explained, and that an FIR need not contain every detail or name every witness; materiality depends on whether an omission alters the prosecution’s basic case (*Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar*; *State of M.P. v. Mansingh*; *Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan*).

An injured witness’s testimony ordinarily merits weight, subject to scrutiny for substantial contradictions (*State of U.P. v. Naresh*).

Medical evidence must be considered with ocular evidence; courts may separate reliable evidence from exaggeration, and the maxim *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus* does not apply (*Achhar Singh v. State of H.P.*).

Defective investigation or absence of ballistic evidence does not automatically defeat an otherwise reliable prosecution case, though a lapse that creates foundational doubt may benefit the accused (*Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab*; *Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab*).

Under Section 34 IPC, common intention may be inferred from conduct and circumstances, may form on the spot, and requires participation in the criminal act; proof of a distinct overt act by every accused is not indispensable.

Alibi is a rule of evidence requiring cogent proof that makes the accused’s presence at the scene physically improbable or impossible (*Vijay Pal v. State*).

The Court accepted the medical treatment and subsequent return of the deceased’s body as a satisfactory explanation for the FIR’s timing, and treated the omissions as particulars rather than a replacement of the basic prosecution account.

It found PW-3’s presence supported by PW-1 and PW-2 and held that his later medical examination, which recorded minor injuries broadly consistent in age with the occurrence, did not by itself discredit him.

Although the medical evidence did not establish the alleged second firearm injury to the stomach, the Court treated that account as an exaggeration or imprecise description and relied on the consistent evidence of A3’s fatal head shot, corroborated by the post-mortem and operation findings.

It acknowledged shortcomings in the investigation, including the delayed recording of PW-3’s statement and absence of ballistic evidence, but held that they did not displace the core eyewitness and medical evidence.

The Court inferred common intention from the accused’s armed arrival, A1’s alleged exhortation, and their concerted participation; it rejected the alibi evidence as insufficient to exclude the appellants’ presence.

The appellants were to remain in custody and serve their sentences; pending applications were disposed of and the trial court record was directed to be returned.