Husband’s Bid to Bar Wife’s DV Act Application Under CrPC Section 468 Fails, Allahabad HC Says

The revisionist challenged the Additional Sessions Judge’s order dated 8 September 2026 and the Civil Judge’s order dated 8 October 2024, which rejected his objection under Section 468 Cr.P.C. to proceedings initiated by his wife under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”).

The wife’s application sought reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the DV Act.

The revisionist argued that the proceedings were time-barred, relying on his assertion that his wife had lived separately since 2018.

The State opposed the revision, contending that Section 468 Cr.P.C. did not apply to a Section 12 application.

Section 468 Cr.P.C. bars a court from taking cognizance of specified offences after the prescribed limitation period; it concerns limitation for prosecuting an offence, not the filing of an application for civil or statutory relief.

Under Sections 12 and 18–22 of the DV Act, an aggrieved person may seek statutory reliefs, while Section 31 makes breach of a protection order or interim protection order an offence; Section 32 addresses cognizance and proof of that offence.

In Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, (2022) 15 SCC 50, the Supreme Court held that filing a Section 12 application is not itself an offence or the initiation of a prosecution; limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. can arise only upon commission of an offence, such as breach of an order under the DV Act.

The Allahabad High Court Division Bench reached the same conclusion in Reference in Re: Trilochan Singh v. Manpreet Kaur and Another, decided 23 October 2021.

Section 12(5) of the DV Act requires the Magistrate to endeavour to dispose of an application within 60 days of its first hearing.

The reliefs sought in the wife’s Section 12 application were under Sections 18–22 of the DV Act, which provide statutory remedies and do not themselves constitute offences.

No protection order or interim protection order had been made, so no breach—and therefore no offence attracting Section 468 Cr.P.C.—had arisen.

Applying Kamatchi and the Division Bench ruling, the Court held that the limitation period could not be measured from the alleged acts of domestic violence or the filing of the Section 12 application.

The revisionist’s objection therefore did not justify disturbing the orders below; the Court also considered that pursuing the inapplicable objection would delay proceedings intended to provide timely relief.

It directed courts dealing with DV Act cases to endeavour to decide pending proceedings within 60 days, including execution proceedings, and directed that the order be communicated to the specified judicial officers and transmitted to the Judicial Training and Research Institute, U.P., for academic purposes.