Petrol-Pump Death: Allahabad HC Rejects Deceased’s Brother’s Appeal to Cancel Bail for Two Accused After Trial Witnesses Testified

The appeals concerned orders granting bail to Junaid Khan @ Sheebu and Arsheel @ Amaan, accused of offences arising from an incident at a petrol pump in which Amit Kumar Verma sustained a fatal neck injury.

The High Court had rejected each accused’s first bail appeal on 9 April 2025, referring, among other things, to eyewitness evidence and CCTV footage.

After the informant and an alleged eyewitness were examined at trial, the accused filed successive bail applications before the Special Judge, which were allowed on 9 October and 3 September 2025, respectively.

The deceased’s brother appealed, contending that the trial court could not grant bail after the High Court had rejected the first bail appeals and that the bail orders should be cancelled.

The Supreme Court had earlier set aside the High Court’s initial cancellation orders for want of a hearing for the accused and remanded the appeals for reconsideration.

On reconsideration, the High Court assessed whether the subsequent bail orders warranted interference.

The Court distinguished cancellation of bail for post-release misconduct or supervening circumstances from setting aside a bail order that is illegal, perverse, or based on irrelevant considerations; either form of intervention requires application of the appropriate legal standard, and bail should not be cancelled mechanically.

A superior court may set aside bail where relevant material or the gravity of the offence was ignored, or the order is perverse or untenable, even without subsequent misconduct.

Under Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, AIR 2005 SC 921, a court considering a successive bail application must consider the reasons for earlier rejection and record the fresh grounds supporting a different decision.

In determining bail, courts must consider the relevant factors—including the prima facie case, gravity and severity of the offence, flight risk, likelihood of repetition, witness influence, and risk to the administration of justice—while balancing liberty and societal interests.

The Court found that the impugned orders were reasoned decisions on the merits, acknowledged the earlier rejection of bail by both the Special Judge and the High Court, and considered the trial testimony of the informant and the alleged eyewitness as the basis for the successive applications.

The appellant did not establish that either accused had misused bail, interfered with evidence, or failed to cooperate with the trial; nor did the preparation of one accused’s bail bonds on the date of filing establish grounds for cancellation.

Applying the distinction between cancellation for misconduct and appellate interference with an unjustified or perverse bail order, the Court found no sufficient basis to interfere.

It did not treat the earlier rejection of bail by the High Court as, by itself, barring consideration of a later application based on changed circumstances.

It directed the trial court to expedite the trial and avoid granting undue adjournments to either party.