An acquittal cannot be reversed where the trial court’s view is plausible on the evidence.

The prosecution alleged that on 26 May 2012, the respondent, driving a bus on NH-66 near Koteswara-Aithalbettu Road, drove rashly and negligently and collided with a motorcycle, causing the rider’s death.

He was charged under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court acquitted him, and the State appealed under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Whether the State had established grounds to interfere with the trial court’s judgment of acquittal.

What order should follow.

The appeal concerned offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and appellate review of an acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

An appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but an acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence. It should not reverse an acquittal merely because another view is possible; interference is warranted where the trial court’s view is not plausible, is perverse, or rests on a material misreading or omission of evidence, and the evidence permits no reasonable conclusion other than guilt.

The court cited Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433; Babu Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581.

On independent reappreciation, the High Court found the prosecution evidence insufficient to establish rashness or negligence beyond reasonable doubt. PW1 had not witnessed the collision, testified that the bus was moving at a normal speed, and did not describe a rash or negligent act by the driver; PW2 likewise arrived after the accident and did not implicate the accused.

Although PW3 attributed the accident to the bus’s high speed and negligent driving, the court found no cogent, convincing, or trustworthy evidence warranting conviction. It also considered the road’s condition and ongoing construction when assessing whether high-speed driving was possible.

The trial court’s acquittal was therefore a plausible view, and the State did not establish a basis for appellate interference.

It also recorded the assistance of the amicus curiae and directed payment of ₹10,000 to him.