An acquittal must stand where the trial court’s view is reasonably supported by evidence.

The State appealed the acquittal of Sohan Singh (A-1) and Balbir Kumar (A-2) by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala.

The prosecution alleged that the accused confined and sexually assaulted nine-year-old G at her home on 16 September 2022 while her mother was away. G testified that one accused inserted a finger into her private part and the other restrained her; A-1 was later apprehended by local residents.

The prosecution relied principally on G’s testimony, her mother’s account of G’s disclosure, medical evidence and statements recorded during the investigation and under Section 164 CrPC.

The trial court found the evidence insufficiently reliable and acquitted both accused; the State challenged that judgment.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference under the principles governing appeals against acquittal.

Whether the evidence, particularly G’s testimony and the supporting oral and medical evidence, proved the accused persons’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution must prove every ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt; the burden does not shift to the accused, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

Under Sections 376, 342 and 34 IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 8 of the POCSO Act, the prosecution had to establish the charged sexual offences and the alleged wrongful confinement and common intention.

A prosecutrix is a competent witness under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, and her credible testimony may sustain a conviction without corroboration; corroborative assurance may be sought where the court has reason to doubt her account.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may interfere where the judgment is perverse or compelling circumstances justify intervention, but should not displace a reasonable view merely because another view is possible: Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor and the subsequent authorities cited by the Court.

The Court held that the trial court’s view was reasonably available on the record.

It identified inconsistencies between G’s trial testimony and her Section 164 CrPC statement, including omissions concerning the brother’s role and the alleged involvement of A-2; it also noted conflicting evidence about whether the accused were previously known to the family.

The aunt to whom G allegedly first disclosed the incident and G’s brother were not examined, while the mother’s account of the alleged participation of A-2 was hearsay.

The medical evidence showed no injury or bleeding and did not support the alleged digital penetration; the Court also found the forensic reports inconclusive.

Considering these matters cumulatively, the Court found G’s testimony insufficiently consistent and credible to establish either accused’s involvement beyond reasonable doubt. It therefore found no perversity or material irregularity in the acquittal.

The State’s appeal was dismissed; A-1, who was in custody, was directed to be released forthwith unless required in another matter.

The trial-court record was ordered returned, and any pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of.