An appeal against a Magistrate’s acquittal is to be treated as a victim appeal before the Sessions Court.

The State of Gujarat instituted proceedings against the respondent-accused under Sections 33EEC(B), 33EEC(C), and 33I(1)(A) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

After investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Harij.

The accused pleaded not guilty, following which the trial proceeded.

By judgment dated 17 September 2012, the trial Court acquitted the accused.

The State thereafter filed the present appeal before the Gujarat High Court under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”).

During the appeal, the High Court considered whether the appeal had been instituted before the appropriate forum in light of the law governing appeals against acquittal by a Magistrate.

Whether an appeal against an acquittal recorded by a Magistrate in a case involving a cognizable and non-bailable offence lies before the High Court or the concerned Sessions Court.

Whether the appeal could be transferred to the Sessions Court and treated as an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Section 413 of the BNSS.

Whether the High Court should examine the merits of the acquittal in the present proceedings while the Supreme Court’s larger-bench consideration of the appellate rights of a victim/complainant remains pending.

The Court referred to Section 378(1)(a) and (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, under which an appeal against a Magistrate’s acquittal in a cognizable and non-bailable case is to be presented before the Sessions Court at the instance of the Public Prosecutor as directed by the District Magistrate, rather than before the High Court, as explained in Subhash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (2013) 2 SCC 17.

The Court also relied on State of Chhattisgarh, through its Station House Officer v. Mohanlal Bagde, 2019 SCC OnLine Chh 102.

It considered the principle in Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran, which recognised a victim’s independent right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC without the requirement of special leave under Section 378(4).

However, the Court also noted the contrary observations in M/s. Everest Automobiles v. M/s. Ranjit Enterprises, SLP (Crl.) No. 12350 of 2024, which stated that Celestium Financial had not considered Satya Pal Singh v. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand, and indicated that an authoritative larger-bench determination was desirable.

The corresponding provision under the BNSS was identified as Section 413.

The High Court observed that the appeal arose from an acquittal by a Magistrate and that the governing principles concerning the proper appellate forum required the matter to be considered by the Sessions Court.

The Court took note of the conflicting authorities on the scope of a victim’s right to appeal and the applicability of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, particularly in view of the pending Supreme Court consideration in M/s. Everest Automobiles.

Since the appeal had been filed before the High Court but was required to be treated as an appeal before the concerned Sessions Court, the Court concluded that the appropriate course was administrative and procedural transfer rather than adjudication on the merits.

It expressly refrained from examining the correctness of the acquittal.

The Sessions Court was directed to treat and number the matter as an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC/Section 413 BNSS and to issue notice to the parties.

The lower appellate Court was requested to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, having regard to its long pendency.

The High Court clarified that it had not considered or expressed any opinion on the merits of the acquittal.