An appellate court cannot overturn acquittal where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible and not perverse.

On 12 January 2017, the prosecutrix alleged that Omprakash Verma entered her house, consumed liquor, followed her into her room, sexually assaulted her while she was asleep, threatened to kill her, and caused injuries by assaulting and strangulating her.

She reported the incident the following day after her husband and children arrived, following which investigation was conducted and the respondent was charged under Sections 450, 376, 323 and 506-B of the IPC.

The prosecution examined 12 witnesses and produced 18 documents, while the respondent denied the allegations and produced four defence documents.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, acquitted the respondent in Sessions Trial No. 03/2017 by judgment dated 25 August 2018.

The State challenged the acquittal under Section 378(1) of the CrPC.

Whether the testimony of the prosecutrix, considered with the oral, medical and documentary evidence, established the offences under Sections 450, 376, 323 and 506-B of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt?

Whether the trial court’s judgment of acquittal was illegal, perverse, or contrary to the evidence so as to warrant interference in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(1) of the CrPC?

The Court considered the offences charged under Sections 450, 376, 323 and 506-B of the IPC and the State’s appellate remedy under Section 378(1) of the CrPC.

It relied on Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544, for the principles governing appeals against acquittal: the evidence must be assessed as a whole; where two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted; and interference is justified only where the acquittal is illegal, perverse, or affected by a material error of law or fact.

Under Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, conviction may rest solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony where it is trustworthy, unblemished, credible and of sterling quality.

Relying on Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443, the Court reiterated that a sole prosecutrix’s testimony cannot be accepted mechanically when it contains material contradictions, is improbable, and lacks supporting medical or forensic evidence.

The Court found that the prosecutrix’s testimony did not possess the reliability and sterling quality required for sustaining a conviction solely on her evidence.

The medical examination disclosed head and forehead injuries but gave no definite opinion supporting rape, and no signs suggestive of rape were found; the chemical examination also detected neither semen nor human sperm on the slides or clothing.

The prosecution witnesses other than the prosecutrix had no direct knowledge of the occurrence and largely repeated her account.

In contrast, defence-related evidence indicated that the injury could have resulted from the prosecutrix striking her head against a doorframe.

Material admissions by the prosecutrix—including that she became unconscious, did not know whether the respondent had assaulted her, did not raise an alarm, and that money was demanded for treatment before the report was lodged—created reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution narrative.

Applying the rule governing appeals against acquittal, the Court held that the trial court’s view was a reasonably possible view based on the evidence and was neither perverse nor illegal.

It held that the prosecution failed to establish the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court’s acquittal did not warrant appellate interference.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal dated 25 August 2018 was affirmed.

A certified copy of the judgment, along with the original record, was directed to be transmitted to the concerned trial court.