An appointment contrary to advertised eligibility criteria is invalid absent an express power of relaxation.

The appellant had worked as an Anganwadi Sevika in Jalgaon District since February 1992. An advertisement issued by the Zilla Parishad, Nashik, invited applications for Anganwadi Supervisor posts and required, inter alia, at least ten years’ experience as an Anganwadi Sevika and that applicants be currently working under the Integrated Child Development Services Scheme in Nashik District. Although the appellant had never worked in Nashik District, she applied and was placed first on the waiting list for an OBC vacancy. After the appointment of the selected candidate was cancelled, the appellant was appointed as Anganwadi Supervisor in Nashik on 4 March 2014.

The sixth respondent, who was otherwise qualified and stood second on the waiting list, challenged the appellant’s appointment before the authorities and thereafter before the Bombay High Court. The High Court held that the appellant was ineligible under the advertisement and the Government Resolution dated 17 November 2001 (“2001 G.R.”), set aside her appointment, directed the State to appoint the sixth respondent, and observed that the appellant could be accommodated as an Anganwadi Sevika in Jalgaon District.

Whether the appellant, who had acquired the requisite experience in Jalgaon District but had not worked in Nashik District, was eligible to apply for and be appointed as an Anganwadi Supervisor in Nashik District under the advertisement and the 2001 G.R.?

Whether the clarification issued by the Divisional Commissioner could validly override or alter the eligibility requirement contained in the 2001 G.R. and the advertisement?

Whether the appellant’s appointment, made due to the appointing authority’s error and continued for approximately three years without blemish, could be sustained against the claim of the next eligible wait-listed candidate?

The Court applied the eligibility conditions in the advertisement and the 2001 G.R., which required an aspirant for appointment as Anganwadi Supervisor to have ten years’ experience as an Anganwadi Sevika in the same district, subject to placement in a nearby project where no vacancy existed in the relevant project.

An administrative authority cannot issue a clarification contrary to the governing Government Resolution; any clarification on a disputed interpretation had to be obtained from the competent Government department. The Court relied on District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655, which holds that appointment in disregard of the qualifications expressly stated in an advertisement prejudices other eligible persons and amounts to a fraud on the public, unless the advertisement expressly reserves a power to relax the essential qualification.

The advertisement expressly restricted applications to Anganwadi Sevikes currently working in Nashik District and required proof of ten years’ experience in that district. The 2001 G.R., read with its relevant clauses, likewise mandated that the experience be acquired in the same district. Since the appellant’s entire relevant experience was in Jalgaon District, she was ineligible at the threshold and ought not to have been considered.

The Divisional Commissioner’s clarification incorrectly treated the absence of an express statement in the G.R. as permitting experience from any district, despite the contrary scheme of the G.R. and the advertisement. The Zilla Parishad was also at fault for failing to scrutinise the appellant’s credentials before permitting her candidature and appointment.

The fact that the appellant had made no misrepresentation and had served without blemish could not cure the substantive absence of eligibility, particularly when the appointment displaced the next eligible candidate and no power to relax the essential condition was reserved in the advertisement.

The Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, dismissed the appeal, and directed that the sixth respondent receive the benefits flowing from the High Court’s judgment within two months, if not already granted. The appellant was permitted to complete unfinished work until 30 September 2026, after which she could not continue in the post she had been holding.