An appointment made in violation of a court order is void ab initio and requires no hearing.

The appellant, Muthuadaikappan, claimed to have acted as Secretary of Seethalakshmi Aachi College for Women and convened a meeting of the College Committee.

The respondents challenged his authority to convene the meeting, contending that he was neither the Secretary of the College nor of the Trust.

The writ petitions in W.P. (MD) Nos.26509 and 26510 of 2024 were allowed, thereby restraining the proposed meeting and preventing consideration of its agenda, including approval of a resolution dated 21.10.2024 by which the appellant had been inducted as a member of the College Committee.

Although the meeting was restrained, the concerned respondents subsequently approved the minutes of the meeting dated 21.10.2024 and appointed or approved the appellant as Secretary of the College.

Contempt petitions were thereafter filed alleging violation of the writ orders.

The learned Single Judge directed cancellation of the appellant’s appointment as Secretary until disposal of Trust O.P. No.72 of 2024 and directed that no other person be approved to function as Secretary during that period.

The appellant challenged that order by filing the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, contending, inter alia, that he had not been heard before his appointment was cancelled.

1. Whether the subsequent approval of the appellant as Secretary, based on the resolution dated 21.10.2024, violated the earlier writ orders restraining consideration of the agenda of the proposed meeting.

2. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in directing cancellation of the appellant’s appointment as Secretary without first hearing him.

3. Whether the appellant had any enforceable right to continue as Secretary when his appointment was consequential to a resolution considered contrary to the writ orders.

The Court applied Clause 15 of the Letters Patent governing the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal.

The Court applied the principle that orders passed in contempt proceedings may require restoration of the position mandated by the original writ order.

It held that an order restraining a meeting necessarily prevents consideration or implementation of the agenda and resolutions proposed for that meeting, including resolutions arising from or dependent upon the restrained process.

The Court further applied the principle that an appointment made in violation of a subsisting court order is void ab initio and does not confer an enforceable right; consequently, the ordinary requirement of prior hearing does not invalidate corrective action where no legal right flows from the appointment.

The Court reasoned that the writ petitions had restrained the proposed meeting and, by necessary implication, prevented consideration or implementation of the agenda placed before it.

The appellant’s appointment as Secretary was nevertheless approved through reliance on the earlier resolution dated 21.10.2024, which formed part of the agenda that had effectively been put on hold by the writ orders.

The Court therefore held that the respondents had indirectly nullified the effect of the writ orders and had acted in violation of them.

Although the appellant was not heard before the direction for cancellation, the Court found that the appointment itself was void ab initio because it was consequential to the prohibited resolution and was made without authority in breach of the Court’s order.

As no enforceable right accrued from such an appointment, the absence of a prior hearing did not warrant interference with the Single Judge’s order.

It upheld the learned Single Judge’s direction to cancel the appellant’s appointment as Secretary, subject to the outcome of Trust O.P. No.72 of 2024, along with the direction that no other person be approved to function as Secretary until the disposal of that proceeding.

The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.