An injunction does not bar property owners from filing eviction proceedings absent special circumstances.

The appeal arose from an ex parte ad interim injunction granted by the learned Trial Judge on 25 June 2026 in T.S. (Com) 09 of 2026.

The appellants claimed to be owners of the concerned immovable property and contended that the injunction effectively restrained them from instituting eviction proceedings.

The plaintiff claimed rights through a joint development agreement dated 27 July 2022, to which the appellants were not parties.

A lease agreement existed between the property owners and the lessee, and the owners had purported to terminate the lease by a letter dated 12 May 2026.

The appellants sought clarification that they remained entitled to institute a suit for eviction.

1. Whether the ex parte ad interim injunction dated 25 June 2026 prevented the appellants, as claimed owners, from instituting a suit for eviction after termination of the lease.

2. Whether, in the absence of special circumstances, the injunction should be modified or construed so as not to affect the maintainability of a future eviction suit.

The Court applied the principle that an owner, upon termination of a lease, is ordinarily entitled to institute a suit for eviction, subject to all objections available to the proposed defendant in that suit.

It further held that an injunction restraining such institution requires special circumstances, which must be apparent from the pleadings and materials placed before the Court.

The Court clarified that an interlocutory injunction should not be construed as creating a bar to the maintainability of independent proceedings unless such restraint is clearly warranted.

No specific statutory provision or judicial precedent was cited in the judgment.

The Court noted that the appellants claimed ownership of the property and had issued a notice dated 12 May 2026 seeking termination of the lease.

Once the lease had purportedly been terminated, the owners were entitled to pursue eviction proceedings, although the validity of the termination and all other objections would remain open for determination in that suit.

The Court found no special circumstances in the plaint or injunction petition justifying a restraint on the appellants’ right to institute such proceedings.

Accordingly, rather than deciding the parties’ rival claims on merits, it construed and modified the injunction to ensure that it did not prevent the filing of an eviction suit or provide a ground to challenge its maintainability.

It further directed that the subsisting injunction could not be relied upon as an objection to the maintainability of any such suit, while preserving all substantive and procedural objections of the parties.

The defendants were permitted to file written objections to the injunction petition by 7 September 2026, with any reply to be filed by 17 September 2026; the matter was listed before the Trial Court on 22 September 2026.

The appeal and connected application were disposed of.