An interim stay cannot restore a removed office-holder after removal has been implemented.

The petitioner, along with other elected Panchs of Gram Panchayat Madhaibhatha, complained of alleged illegal withdrawal and misappropriation of Panchayat funds by respondent No. 6, the elected Sarpanch, including the use of an allegedly false Panchayat resolution.

Enquiries were conducted, and the material collected was referred to the Sub-Divisional Officer/Prescribed Authority for proceedings under Section 40 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993.

After affording respondent No. 6 an opportunity of hearing, the Prescribed Authority removed him from the office of Sarpanch under Section 40(1) and debarred him from contesting Panchayat elections for six years under Section 40(2).

Consequential proceedings under Section 38 resulted in the petitioner’s appointment as temporary Sarpanch on 22.06.2026, after which he assumed charge.

Respondent No. 6’s application for interim relief was rejected by the Collector on 25.06.2026; however, the Commissioner, in revision, stayed the implementation of the removal order for thirty days on 06.07.2026.

The petitioner challenged that interim order under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that it effectively restored respondent No. 6 to an office from which he had already been removed.

The Court applied Sections 38, 40(1) and 40(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993: Section 40 authorises removal and consequential disqualification of a Sarpanch, while Section 38 permits a temporary arrangement following a casual vacancy.

It also considered the revisional authority’s power to grant interim relief under the statutory appellate and revisional framework, including Rule 8 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayats (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995.

The Court relied on Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P., (2003) 4 SCC 104, for the principle that interim orders should not ordinarily stay termination, dismissal or removal in a manner that permits a person to continue in public office without a subsisting right.

It further relied on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Prem Chopra, (2024) 12 SCC 426, explaining through Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Assn., (1992) 3 SCC 1, that staying the operation of an order is distinct from quashing it, although interim relief cannot be used to undo completed consequences or restore a prior position without adequate justification.

Interim relief must be exercised judicially and must not substantially grant the final relief sought in the substantive proceedings.

The Court found that the removal order had already been implemented before the Commissioner granted interim relief: the vacancy had been acted upon under Section 38, and the petitioner had been appointed and had assumed charge as temporary Sarpanch.

Therefore, the Commissioner’s order did not merely preserve the subject matter of the revision; in practical effect, it revived respondent No. 6’s position and disturbed an arrangement already created through statutory proceedings.

The Commissioner had not recorded any specific prima facie finding that the removal order was without jurisdiction, perverse or contrary to natural justice, despite the Prescribed Authority having conducted an enquiry and afforded respondent No. 6 an opportunity of hearing.

The balance of convenience also favoured maintaining the existing arrangement, since permitting conflicting claims to the office of Sarpanch would create administrative uncertainty in the functioning of the Gram Panchayat.

While the Commissioner possessed jurisdiction to consider interim relief, that jurisdiction did not authorise an interim order which effectively conferred the substantive benefit that respondent No. 6 could obtain only if he ultimately succeeded in the revision.

The Court expressly refrained from examining the merits of the allegations or the correctness of the removal order.

The writ petition was allowed; the Commissioner’s interim order was quashed and set aside, and the Collector’s order refusing interim relief was upheld.

The Commissioner was directed to transmit the relevant records to the Collector, who was directed to decide the substantive statutory proceedings independently, after hearing all concerned parties, preferably within four months of receiving the records.

The Court clarified that its observations would not prejudice the merits of the pending proceedings.

There was no order as to costs.