An officer holding current charge may initiate disciplinary proceedings when expressly empowered under delegated authority.

The respondents in Writ Appeal Nos. 616/2024, 1317/2024 and 1449/2024 were employees of the appellant Electricity Distribution Companies against whom charge-sheets were issued proposing departmental enquiries.

The charge-sheets were issued by officers holding the current charge of higher posts, including Chief Engineer, Additional Chief Engineer and other disciplinary authorities, pursuant to the Companies’ Delegation of Powers.

The employees challenged the charge-sheets on the ground that the issuing officers were not substantively appointed to the higher posts and therefore lacked disciplinary jurisdiction.

The learned Single Judge accepted this objection, principally relying on Girija Shankar Shukla v. SDO, Harda, AIR 1973 MP 104, and quashed the charge-sheets.

The Companies preferred appeals.

Writ Appeal No. 1724/2024 was filed by an employee raising the same issue concerning the competence of an officer holding current charge.

1. Whether an officer entrusted with the current charge of a higher post under the Company’s Delegation of Powers is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and issue a charge-sheet against employees falling within the disciplinary jurisdiction of that higher post.

2. Whether an officer holding current charge, but not substantively appointed to the higher post, is legally incompetent to exercise disciplinary powers merely because of the absence of substantive appointment.

3. Whether the charge-sheets ought to have been quashed at the threshold on the technical ground that they were issued by officers holding current charge.

The appeals were maintainable under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

The employees’ service conditions were governed by the applicable service regulations and the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, as adopted by the Electricity Companies, together with the Company’s Delegation of Powers.

Under Part-A, Section IV of the Delegation of Powers, an Additional Chief Engineer/Superintending Engineer in charge of a Circle was vested with full disciplinary powers over Class III and Class IV employees under his administrative control.

In Gopalji Khanna v. Allahabad Bank, (1996) 3 SCC 538, the Supreme Court held that an officer placed in charge of a higher office may discharge the functions attached to that office, even though such entrustment does not amount to substantive promotion.

A. Savariar v. Secretary, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, 2008 (4) CTC 753, established that, unless a contrary intention appears from statutory provisions or executive instructions, an officer holding a post in charge may discharge its statutory functions.

Girija Shankar Shukla was held to operate in its particular statutory and factual context, especially where no authorization to exercise the higher powers existed.

The Court also relied on P.S. Dhanwal and Mahendra Pratap Singh for the principle that competence must be assessed under the governing statutory and administrative framework, not merely by reference to the label “current charge”.

A charge-sheet only initiates disciplinary proceedings and does not itself impose a penalty.

The Court examined the Company’s Delegation of Powers and found that it did not merely assign ministerial or administrative duties to officers holding current charge; it expressly authorized such officers to exercise the powers attached to the higher office, including disciplinary powers over the specified employees.

Applying Gopalji Khanna and A. Savariar, the Court held that substantive appointment to the higher post was not indispensable where the competent authority had entrusted the officer with the office and its associated powers.

The Court distinguished Girija Shankar Shukla because that decision involved the absence of any authorization empowering the officer to exercise the higher statutory functions.

It rejected an absolute rule that an officer holding current charge is always incompetent, stating that competence depends on the applicable statute, service rules and Delegation of Powers.

Since the charge-sheets merely commenced disciplinary proceedings and the employees would have full opportunity to contest the allegations in a regular enquiry, interference at the threshold was also considered inappropriate.

Writ Appeal Nos. 616/2024, 1317/2024 and 1449/2024 filed by the Electricity Distribution Companies were allowed, and the orders of the learned Single Judge quashing the charge-sheets were set aside.

Writ Appeal No. 1724/2024 filed by the employee was dismissed.

No order was made as to costs.