An order is vitiated when the authority hearing the petitioner differs from the authority deciding the matter.

The petitioner challenged the proceedings dated 12 June 2026 issued by the Principal Secretary to the Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, concerning recovery of the subject lands, through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

The challenge was based on the ground that the petitioner had been heard by the Additional Chief Secretary on 17 July 2025, whereas the impugned order was subsequently passed by the Principal Secretary, a different authority

The respondents stated that the matter could be remanded to the Principal Secretary for reconsideration, while requesting that questions concerning jurisdiction be left open

By order dated 1 September 2026, the High Court remanded the matter for reconsideration.

On 22 September 2026, while the matter was listed for being mentioned, the Court substituted paragraph 4 of the earlier order to expressly record that the impugned order stood set aside

Whether an order is vitiated by violation of natural justice when the authority who hears the affected party is different from the authority who ultimately passes the decision.

Whether the impugned proceedings dated 12 June 2026 required to be set aside and remanded for reconsideration, without the Court expressing any opinion on the merits or jurisdiction.

The Court applied the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule that the authority who hears a party must ordinarily be the authority who decides the matter; otherwise, the hearing may become an empty formality

The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 permits the High Court to set aside administrative action affected by procedural unfairness and remand the matter for fresh consideration

The Court further directed that any report or other material proposed to be relied upon must be furnished to the petitioner, thereby applying the disclosure and fair-hearing requirements of natural justice

No statutory provision or judicial precedent was expressly relied upon in the order.

The Court accepted the petitioner’s contention that the person who heard the petitioner and the person who passed the impugned order were different authorities, namely, the Additional Chief Secretary and the Principal Secretary

Since the respondents themselves agreed to reconsideration, the Court treated the procedural defect as warranting remand rather than adjudicating the merits of the land dispute or the question of jurisdiction

The Court also preserved procedural fairness by permitting the petitioner to make additional submissions and directing that copies of any Housing Board report or other material relied upon be supplied to it

The matter was remanded to the first respondent for fresh reconsideration in accordance with law.

The petitioner was permitted to submit additional materials, and any report or material proposed to be relied upon was required to be furnished to it.

The Court expressly left the merits and jurisdictional questions open

The writ petition was disposed of without costs, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed