An unexplained cancelled demand draft did not rebut the Section 139 presumption of legally enforceable debt.

The complainant alleged that the petitioner issued two post-dated cheques of ₹10,00,000 each towards the agreed purchase of her share in land at Nellukunte Village.

Both cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds, and the petitioner did not pay after receiving statutory notices; the complainant accordingly filed two complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).

The petitioner’s defence was that the cheques related to an earlier land transaction: he contended that the complainant had received ₹16,00,000 under a confirmation deed and release deed in 2016, and that the cheques were not issued for a separate enforceable debt.

The trial court convicted the petitioner in both cases and imposed a fine of ₹15,50,000 in each, directing payment of ₹15,40,000 to the complainant as compensation; the appellate court dismissed both appeals and confirmed the convictions and sentences.

The petitioner challenged those concurrent decisions in revision.

1. Whether the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence were perverse, grossly erroneous or otherwise met the threshold for interference in revision.

2. Whether the petitioner rebutted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act by showing that the cheques were not issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Section 138 of the NI Act applies where a cheque drawn towards a legally enforceable debt or liability is dishonoured for insufficiency of funds and the statutory demand and non-payment requirements are satisfied.

Sections 118 and 139 create rebuttable presumptions that a cheque was issued for consideration and towards discharge, wholly or partly, of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

The Court applied the principles governing Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: revisional jurisdiction is supervisory, not a second appeal, and ordinarily does not permit reappreciation of evidence absent a glaring feature amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

It relied on Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, Criminal Appeal No. 3654 of 2026, and the authorities discussed there, including State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659, and State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452.

Interference may be warranted where findings are perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable, unsupported by material, or reached through arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.

The Court accepted that the complainant had executed the confirmation and release deeds in favour of the earlier purchasers and that the petitioner’s case was that the ₹16,00,000 payment connected with those deeds accounted for the transaction.

However, it considered the complainant’s evidence that the disputed cheques represented a separate amount, and noted that the petitioner had drawn a demand draft for ₹18,00,000 in the complainant’s name during the proceedings and later cancelled it.

The Court treated the draft evidence, together with the petitioner’s failure to establish that it related to the proposed purchase of the retained 11 guntas, as supporting the complainant’s case and held that the statutory presumptions had not been rebutted.

Applying the restricted revisional standard, it declined to disturb the concurrent findings.

The order states that the point for consideration was answered “in Affirmative”, although the ensuing reasoning and operative order dismiss the revisions; the judgment does not explain this apparent inconsistency.

The High Court dismissed both revision petitions, thereby leaving in force the convictions and sentences confirmed by the appellate court.