An unimpeachable agreement negating ownership misrepresentation can justify quashing a cheating FIR.

The petitioner, arrayed as A1, and his wife entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 19 June 2006 with the second respondent concerning approximately 20 acres of land, including 220 plots. The complainant alleged that, relying on representations regarding ownership and possession, she paid approximately ₹80 lakhs, handed over original title documents relating to 13 cents of land, and paid further amounts for procurement of adjoining lands. She subsequently discovered that several properties mentioned in the MoU were not owned by the petitioner or his wife according to revenue records and alleged cheating, misappropriation and forgery

Crime No.40 of 2018 was registered under Sections 406, 420 and 34 of the IPC. The petitioner’s earlier quashing petition had been allowed on 20 March 2025, but the Supreme Court set aside that order in Crl.A.No.1671 of 2026 and directed fresh consideration. The petitioner relied on the MoU, which described him as a “land aggregator,” whereas the complainant alleged that he had falsely represented himself as the owner

Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclosed the ingredients of cheating under Sections 415 and 420 of the IPC, particularly deception, dishonest inducement and dishonest intention at the time of inducement

Whether the prosecution for criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the IPC was barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.

Whether the High Court could rely upon the MoU, an allegedly unimpeachable document of sterling quality, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR

The Court applied Sections 406, 415, 420 and 34 of the IPC and Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. It held that cheating under Section 420 requires the ingredients of Section 415—deception, fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver property, and dishonest intention existing at the time of inducement

The Court relied on Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, for the principles governing quashing of criminal proceedings at the FIR stage. It also applied the principles in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, as reiterated in Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 825, permitting reliance on defence material where it is of sterling and impeccable quality, conclusively negates the prosecution allegations, remains unrebutted, and demonstrates that continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process

The Court further held that an offence under Section 406 IPC, punishable with imprisonment up to three years, was subject to the limitation period under Section 468 Cr.P.C.

The Court found that the alleged misappropriation under Section 406 IPC related to the 2006 transaction, while the FIR was registered only in 2018; consequently, the prosecution was held to be beyond the applicable limitation period

For Section 420 IPC, although the FIR alleged that the petitioner represented himself as owner and induced the complainant to part with ₹80 lakhs and title documents, the MoU itself described the petitioner as a land aggregator. Treating the MoU as an admitted and unimpeachable document, the Court held that it contradicted the central allegation that the petitioner had falsely represented himself as the owner. In the backdrop of that document, the FIR did not establish deception or dishonest intention at the time of inducement, which were essential ingredients of cheating

The Court clarified that the mere availability of a civil remedy would not justify quashing where criminal ingredients were otherwise disclosed; however, in this case, the allegations even if accepted in their entirety did not constitute the alleged offences

The FIR in Crime No.40 of 2018 pending before the District Crime Branch, Kancheepuram, was therefore quashed in its entirety as against the petitioner. The Criminal Original Petition was allowed and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed